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INTRODUCTION
The present report is dedicated to one of the most serious problems of the
Bulgarian transition to market economy, stable democratic institutions and the rule of
law. The explosive growth of trans-border crime in the last 12 years led to the emer-
gence of a criminal infrastructure, developed and maintained by criminal groups and
quasi-legal "power groups," which have appeared in the mentioned period. The trans-
border crime in Bulgaria is part of the new network of international organized crime,
prospering after the end of the Cold War and closely connected to regional channels
of smuggling and trafficking. Smuggling (including drug smuggling) and trafficking are
in particular the main sources of income for organized crime in the country.
In the macro-economic context, trans-border crime became an important instru-
ment for illegal redistribution of national wealth. Due to the open character of the
Bulgarian economy, the legal movement of goods across the borders generates over
40 percent of the Bulgarian budget revenues, and import-export transactions repre-
sent two thirds of the gross national product. This means that revenues, generated
through trans-border trade, are higher than those, acquired through privatization of
state property. Smuggling is also stimulated by the large gray economy sector, which
incorporates a diverse system of gray retail and wholesale trade.
An additional factor, contributing extensively to the growth of trans-border crime,
was the sequence of military conflicts in the Western Balkans in the 1990s. The
processes of violent disintegration of former Yugoslavia were accompanied with
smuggling of weapons, oil and other goods on unprecedented scale. Illegal trans-bor-
der trade expanded even more after embargo regimes were imposed on our western
neighbors. This in its own turn led to the active participation of the Bulgarian criminal
underworld in smuggling operations to Macedonia and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Bulgaria became a mediator in the illegal flow
of smuggled petrol products, weapons and various other goods, including drugs smug-
gled through the traditional route, as well as through several new ones.
It is impossible to successfully fight trans-border crime in the country without the
determined effort to counter systemic corruption within the law-enforcing and law-
protecting institutions. An enormous part of criminal acts and irregularities concern-
ing import and export of goods, drugs and weapons, as well as trafficking in human
beings, is conducted through unlawful cooperation with customs officers, employees
of the National Border Police Service and other state institutions, responsible for bor-
der control. Corruption networks are part of the systemic smuggling or of the so-called
smuggling channels, and the funds for bribing state employees represent "production
costs" for organizers of smuggling.
The mutual inter-dependence between corruption and smuggling was analyzed in
the report on trans-border crime, published by the Center for the Study of Democracy
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in 2000 Corruption and Trafficking: Monitoring and Prevention. This report was an
important step towards the introduction of a working methodology for assessment of
this phenomenon in the context of countries in transition. Measures for countering
trans-border crime were also proposed.
The present report continues the previous effort and summarizes researches and
discussions conducted by members of the expert group within the framework of the
anti-corruption initiative Coalition 2000, established in 1997
(http://www.online.bg/coalition2000/). The report’s goal is to present the overall pic-
ture of systemic smuggling and corruption, which makes this smuggling possible, and
to give an assessment of the efforts of anti-corruption reform in state institutions,
above all in the Customs Agency and the Ministry of Interior.
Without any doubt, it is difficult to present an accurate assessment of the discussed
problems, due to the lack of information about the exact parameters of smuggling, in
particular of drug smuggling, and about the real scale of corrupt practices. Hence the
importance of indirect indicators like marketing research on particular goods on the
market, and methods for comparison of such data with official customs statistics for
import and export of these goods. Apart from these methods, of particular importance
is the role of export analyses, reporting on informal "price-lists" of corrupt services, as
well as of the volume and value of smuggling deals and operations.
This publication summarizes the findings, based on the positions of the experts of
Coalition 2000: Boyko Slavchev, Advisor, Cabinet of the Minister of Interior; Georgi
Georgiev, Senior Inspector, National Customs Agency; Dr. Dimitar Yotov,
Associate Professor and Head of Department, Academy of the Ministry of
Interior; Ivaylo Angelov, Expert, Bulgartabak Holding; Ivan Gospodov, Expert; Dr.
Emil Tzenkov, Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of Democracy; Zhanet
Papazova, Head of Information and Analyses Section, National Service for
Combating Organized Crime (NSCOC); Petkan Iliev, Senior Fellow, Center for the
Study of Democracy; Roumen Danev, Director of Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Directorate, National Customs Agency; Slavcho Mihalkov, Expert,
National Border Police Service; Tihomir Bezlov, Senior Fellow, Center for the
Study of Democracy; and Chavdar Kanev, State Inspector, National Customs
Agency.
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1. SMUGGLING OF CONSUMER GOODS AND 
RELATED CORRUPTION
The term smuggling has three different meanings:
a general term for illegal activities of importers and exporters in connection with
customs legislation;
a synonym for the term "customs violations and offences";
it can denote one of the possible customs violations, regulated in Article 233 of the
Customs Law – "transporting or carrying of goods through the state border without
the knowledge and permission of customs authorities" (this term is used also for
violations against the customs regime according to the Penal Code – Article 242).
In popular usage, the outright smuggling is defined as "black import" (and the cor-
responding "black export"), while violations, which for instance are related to frauds
with documents, are considered as "gray import" ("gray export").
The term smuggling will be used here in its largest meaning – for all illegal activi-
ties involving import, export and transit of goods.
Smuggling or illegal transfer of goods, valuables and other items across the state
border is international in character, because it involves violation of the laws of more
than one country. The present report deals only with the national dimensions of
smuggling, since there is still no appropriately accessible and systematic data for this
type of criminal activities in the neighboring Balkan countries. 
Discussing smuggling and counter-smuggling efforts of customs authorities in
Bulgaria, it should be noted that the preconditions for the appearance of customs and
currency violations and offences are of economic character. 
Customs violations and offenses are a direct consequence of economic environ-
ment in the country and are highly influenced by a number of crime-inciting factors:
In the first place, the high level of gray economy and the "high liquidity" of smug-
gled goods stimulate the illegal import in large quantities.
In the second place, the profits from trade with illegally imported goods (com-
pared with the trade with domestically produced or legally imported goods) are still
too high and the risks of sanctions too low. It is often more profitable for perpetrators
to risk being fined than to pay due taxes to the state.
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In the third place, the less strict border control combined with the liberalization
of import-export regimes stimulates the illegal import of goods, which do not meet
the quality standards or were bought abroad under suspicious circumstances. Some
of the neighboring states (for example, Turkey) create favorable conditions, used both
by large-scale smugglers and by "suitcase traders" to conduct practically unlimited
import of goods, sold on dumping prices and often on the gray market. 
Apart from these factors, also displayed in the other countries in transition, a fea-
ture specific to Bulgaria should be noted, namely that the import-export transac-
tions represent a large share of the gross domestic product (GDP). This circum-
stance is not being given enough attention when the scale of smuggling activities is
assessed or when priorities of state policies are set. The following needs to be con-
sidered in this respect:
The border has turned to be one of the main mechanisms for illegal redistribu-
tion of national wealth and for criminal accumulation of private capital. The
main reason for this is that Bulgaria, like other countries with small markets, has an
"open economy." According to official statistics, between 65 and 80 percent of the
GDP is transferred through state borders in the form of import and export.
According to international estimates, with the almost complete liberalization of
foreign trade, the border began to provide between 30 and 50 percent "price
advantage" to those importers, who violate the laws, regulating import and export.
With the value of annual import and export between $8 and 10 billion, selective
enforcement of the law resulted in redistribution of $20-30 billion in the last 11
years. In other words, the wealth redistributed "along the border" equals or even
exceeds the total value of privatization and restitution in the last 10 years.
The border functions as a generator of liquidations and bankruptcies. The lack
of normal border control favors "gray importers" of foreign goods to the detriment
of Bulgarian industry. Paying the due taxes and fees, unlike their unscrupulous
competitors, hundreds of Bulgarian enterprises and whole traditional branches
were destroyed and subsequently disappeared. 
The illegally acquired price advantage of "gray importers" during the last decade
additionally deformed the economic rationality1 of the emerging market (includ-
ing the activities of the large multi-national companies). This has additionally
delayed the transition of the country to market economy and the integration of its
economy into the global market.
Apart from the factors listed above, the following ones also influence the range of
smuggling activities: development of the interaction between state institutions in
regard with the control over the complete process, which involves the chain "pro-
ducer – exporter/importer – trader"; the range of jurisdiction of authorities (including
customs); the state of criminal and administrative-criminal law and its application with
an optimal use of punitive prevention of potential violations; the state of judicial sys-
tem, etc.
Since smuggling is closely linked to corruption, the paper focuses on those cases
of smuggling, which are realized with the knowledge and cooperation of state ser-
1 Trans-border crime is by far not the only or the main factor, distorting the normal market relations in
the country
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vants, whose prerogative is to cut illegal practices. This decision is determined by the
fact that almost in all cases smuggling channels in Bulgaria function on such principles. 
*       *       *
When analyzing the situation and trends in trans-border crime and related to it
corruption, we should note above all that in the end of 1990s, certain favorable
regional processes have emerged. These have created conditions for normalization
of trans-border trade and for limiting smuggling and other forms of customs violations:
Above all, albeit slowly, the situation along the borders with neighboring countries
began to stabilize. After the fall of the Milosevic regime, the new Serbian customs
and border institutions started to limit some of the traditional schemes for customs
violations. 
Few of the largest smuggling networks were cut after the international peacekeep-
ing forces entered Macedonia and Kosovo. 
Positive development occurred also on Romanian borders, especially on the bor-
ders with Moldova and Ukraine.
These developments represent an objective precondition for limiting the smug-
gling to and through Bulgaria. 
Within the country smuggling and related to it gray economy are naturally limit-
ed by the ongoing development of market economy relations. More specifically, with
the appearance of huge multi-national companies and well-known international
hyper- and super-market chains, many of the traditional gray markets for various
types of goods started to shrink. This led to a substantial decrease of illegal import
of certain consumer goods like coffee, milk products, detergents, alcohol, etc.
The change of government, following the June 2001 Parliamentary elections,
has also had a positive effect. As a rule, each new government, especially in the
beginning of its term, engages in anti-corruption efforts and strives to develop a posi-
tive public image together with the imperative need to attract additional revenue for
the budget.
Unlike in the recent past, no signs for political corruption (that is for distribution
of revenues from smuggling on political level) have been detected in the Customs
Agency in the period 2001-2002. The topic of "briefcases" stuffed with dollars peri-
odically delivered by couriers of smugglers to politicians’ offices in Sofia seems to be
no longer on the agenda. This in its own turn enlarges the revenues on the lower lev-
els of corruption schemes, but at the same time, since this criminal activity is no
longer secured by the political cover, increases the uncertainty and potential risk. 
Yet, despite several actions of the law-enforcing institutions, which temporarily
disrupted the work of the criminal groups controlling illegal import and trade with
goods, several smuggling channels continued to operate in 2002. These channels
harm the national industry and deprive the state budget of revenues. 
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This conclusion is confirmed by a number of indirect indicators:
The "division of labor" between big bosses, specialized in illegal import of specific
types of goods has been preserved.
Despite several personnel changes, many of the accomplices within the customs
administration, border police and other state law-enforcing and supervising insti-
tutions have kept their positions.
Stable "rates" for illegal import of goods are a public secret, which testifies about
the presence of smuggling services on the market.
1.1. CLASSIFICATION OF SMUGGLING 
The following types of smuggling operations are the most widely spread:
Outright smuggling ("opened barriers")
In such cases, the imported goods are not registered at all with the customs and
other institutions. In the large majority of cases of outright smuggling, criminal
complicity of public servants at the border is involved. 
Abuse of the "time" factor
Corrupt customs officials often abuse the fact that time frame for accomplish-
ment of customs service is not prescribed in order to extract bribes. For exam-
ple, by deliberately delaying the customs clearance for perishable goods, the
owner is forced to pay a bribe in order to speed up the process. Alternatively, a
bribe may be given by a third person in order to hold the goods until they get
spoiled. Thus the bribe-giver eliminates the market competitor. 
The reverse case can be witnessed when a particular importer is given advantage
before its competitors by speeding up the process of customs clearance or by get-
ting the clearance after the end of the working day. Then, the importer’s expens-
es are reduced (expenses for storage, those related to contracts for timely delivery
of goods, etc.) and the customs officer turns to his benefit the importer’s econom-
ic interest as a precondition for extracting a bribe. 
Falsification of the documents accompanying goods 
– A significant part of violations is linked to the origin of the goods and to taking
advantage of certain preferences, related to this origin. Practice proved that
cases in which false certificates of origin were submitted to and accepted by the
customs are abundant. Despite the fact that in many of these cases it was pos-
sible to disclose the violation during the customs procedure, this did not take
place. Often customs officials themselves instruct the violators which false doc-
uments should be presented and how they should be falsified. In such cases,
the violator pays a bribe to the customs official for accepting the false docu-
ment as genuine one. Bribes are not given only inside the customs service, but
are paid also to experts in laboratories where untrue expert opinions are pro-
duced, to the administrative employees in Ministries and departments for issu-
ing certificates containing false information, and to notaries legalizing appar-
ently false documents.
– A consequence of customs violations resulting from the use of incorrect tariff
number and description of goods is that lower or no taxes and fees are paid.
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For instance, the goods with high tariff rate are presented to customs institu-
tions, but in the customs declaration tariff number with reduced or zero rate is
given. In such cases, customs officials intentionally accept declarations con-
taining untrue data and allow the import of goods after receiving the bribe. It
needs mentioning that in some cases, customs officials advise importers to pro-
vide the lower tariff number in the declaration, indicate to the importer how
much money would be saved and initiate negotiations on how much of the
saved money should be given to the official for this "service."
– Violations, related to the value declared in Uniform Administrative
Document (UAD) and accompanying documents, are based on the declara-
tion of a lower value of goods in the documents. The customs officials are
obliged to check the declared value and if there is any suspicion regarding its
accuracy, they have to determine the true value according to modes and
methods, envisaged in the customs legislation. In such cases of criminal coop-
eration between the violator and the customs official, the latter does not
demand from the importer to present additional documents regarding the price
of the goods, but accepts the apparently reduced fictive value. By not carrying
out the necessary verification and allowing the customs clearance at obviously
lowered value, the customs official assists in the fraud.
Violations involving customs regimes
In some cases, customs officials allow the abuse of the customs regime, which
enables the importer to avoid payment (temporary or for a longer period of time)
of due customs duties and taxes, for instance, by unjustifiably using preferences
and customs concessions. In some cases, fictive destruction of goods, following a
fictive confiscation or abandonment is employed. In this case, the violator makes
an agreement with the commission in charge of destruction, which prepares a false
document, testifying about the destruction of the goods although such has not
occurred.
Substitution of documents accompanying goods 
Such substitution usually occurs between the dispatching customs office in the
country of export and the receiving customs office in Bulgaria and represents
another form of criminal cooperation between customs violators and customs offi-
cials. Substitution of genuine documents with false ones allows for declaration of
smaller quantity of goods or for declaration of goods with lower customs rate,
which leads to payment of lower custom duties. Documents can be substituted by
the importers themselves without the involvement of customs officials. Yet, this
sharply increases the risk of disclosure of the violation. That is why violators prefer
to make an arrangement with customs officials, especially in cases of permanent-
ly active schemes over a prolonged period of time. In such cases, the customs offi-
cial knows that the documents have been substituted with the false ones and con-
sciously assists in the violation. The official inspects only the side rows of goods in
the transport vehicle and notes in the protocol that the declared corresponds to
what has been physically examined. The central part of the vehicle, where the
offensive goods are located, is intentionally not inspected.
Violations involving customs decrees in free zones
These include violation of the decrees prohibiting or limiting the presence of cer-
tain types of goods on the territory of the zones; illegal transfer of the goods from
the territory of the zone and their import into the country; retail trade with the
10 CSD Reports 11
goods, located in the free zones or in customs warehouses; violations occurring
during the re-exporting operations, etc.
Violations connected to the destruction of goods
They involve fictive or partial destruction of goods, which benefits the importer or
other persons, including customs and other officials; these cases also involve
destruction of goods, which could be used by the state, etc.
Sale of the goods in advance
There are numerous cases of criminal cooperation between customs officials and
managers of various companies involving the advanced sale of goods, imported
without customs clearance. In such cases, the importer sells the goods before pay-
ing the appropriate customs duties and other taxes and in this way receives an ille-
gal credit. After the goods are sold, the importer pays the whole or a part of the
duties and taxes to be paid.
CORRUPTION WITHIN THE CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION
Due to their character, smuggling operations are usually characterized by a high
level of organization, as customs officials establish corruption-promoting partnership
with businessmen-relatives, criminal groups and their companies, trading structures
specialized in gray import, transport companies and individual importers. The officials
of the Ministry of Interior, securing the smuggling channels also belong to corruption
networks, as well as officials of other state institutions controlling the borders and the
interior of the state. Thus, long-lasting corrupt relations are created, providing the
involved importers with certain privileges.2
Customs officials take bribes when conducting one-time "services" as well as
when involved in long-term cooperation with particular trading or other struc-
tures participating in import-export operations. In some cases, the customs officials
make violations under the influence of particular representatives of the central or
local governments, influential economic structures and criminal organizations.
The customs officials receiving bribes are aware of the amount of money the per-
sons involved in illegal activities have saved because of their assistance and they know
how to receive their percentage. The percentage depends on the level of risk
involved, or on the need to coordinate the actions of the corrupt customs officials
with the actions of other officials from the customs administration. Usually, the bribe
is around 30 percent of the unpaid customs duties and other fees. Apart from
receiving money for bribes, a part of the customs officials get to buy certain goods at
reduced prices, receive long-term loans or are offered free service in restaurants and
other similar places.
2 For instance, such traders are served faster, they are given the opportunity to postpone their pay-
ments, their goods are rarely inspected by the customs, they are often acquitted from responsibility
for customs violations they perform, etc. From their side, the trader involved in such scheme sells
goods at reduced prices to the customs officials, or employs their relatives and friends. Bribes are paid
for general patronage and not for concrete actions, and are paid periodically on weekly or monthly
basis. 
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What is really alarming is the persistent tendency of officials from almost all lev-
els within the customs administration to be involved in corruption violations:
Border customs department
Violations classifies as "outright corruption," that is without customs clearance for
the imported goods, are performed at the border. They involve respective officials
of the border customs department, as well as other state officials at the border.
Border and interior customs bureau
A larger part of customs violations involves two or more customs departments, for
instance a department at the border and another in the interior, or the dispatch-
ing and receiving customs department. Thus, preconditions for organizing corrup-
tion schemes within customs departments are created, with customs official in the
receiving department covering up for the official in the dispatching department.
Conditions for organized corruption are also there, with customs officials per-
forming activities according to a prearranged plan, leading to the evasion of pay-
ment of customs duties and other fees at various times and places. For example,
the incorrect tariff number is cited, the customs value is reduced, the lower cus-
toms rate is calculated or an inspection, which "testifies" about the presence of
goods that are in fact not present in the transport vehicle, conducted.
System of post-clearance control
In the scope of such control, customs officials establish that a certain violation has
occurred, but do not write the obligatory protocol. Depending on the sum bene-
fiting the violator, a bribe is negotiated.
System of internal supervision
There are cases in which customs officials, participating in administrative-punitive
proceedings negotiate with the violators and conduct acts, which lead to the
reduction of fines, termination of administrative-punitive proceedings, and unlaw-
ful acquittal. In other words, in exchange for an appropriate reward, conditions for
termination of administrative-punitive proceedings or preconditions for the issued
punitive decree to be revoked by the court are created. For this to happen, the
evidence is deliberately omitted from the decree, and procedural violations are
made, which leads to the revoking of the decree. For instance, the evidences are
not collected or presented, the issuing of the decree is deliberately delayed until
the deadlines envisaged by the law expire, the decree is intentionally left incom-
plete, the investigation itself is not objective and important evidence is hidden.
The role of informers
Certain corrupt customs officials inform on forthcoming inspections and other
actions of the competent institutions in exchange for appropriate bribes. The
informer warns the violator, advises that certain goods or documents are hidden
and in this way prevents the disclosure of customs violations and offenses.
Abuse of authority
There are indications that some high-ranking customs officials give illegal verbal
directions to their subordinates and force them to act contrary to the law. For
instance, they order that particular goods are let go through the customs, deter-
mine under which conditions and where this would happen, decide whether
inspection should be conducted or not, etc.
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Continuous complaints show that the problem with corruption in the customs is
not yet solved. Numerous factors account for this, and some of them are of subjec-
tive character. Unsatisfactorily organized internal supervision and the lack of an infor-
mation system enabling continuous supervision of activities of all sub-departments of
the Agency in the real time are among the most serious failures in the functioning of
this institution. Combined with the huge quantity of documentation, the large nor-
mative base, as well as the contradictions between particular norms of customs legis-
lation, this enables the corrupt officials to conceal the conducted violations and
offences for at least a certain period of time.
On the other hand, the measures taken by the management to disclose the vio-
lations are insufficient. The efforts to curb violations and offenses are often ham-
pered by the fact that violators and persons involved in the smuggling try to compro-
mise honest and uncorrupted officials of the customs administration, who refuse to
participate in criminal acts or work actively for the disclosure and prevention of cus-
toms violations and offenses.
Corruption is a problem also in other law-enforcing state institutions involved in
countering smuggling. Especially dangerous is the role of corrupt practices within the
Ministry of Interior, which has the specific task of fighting corruption in all state insti-
tutions. 
TYPOLOGY OF CORRUPTION PARTNERSHIPS
The analysis of various types of trans-border crime has outlined the following most
typical smuggling schemes, listed according to the scope of their destructive impact
on economy and security of the country:
1. The large corruption schemes, linked with illegal import, export and transit of
goods in large quantities, are characterized by the presence of a big organized group
of people cooperating with each other. Most of these people do not know each other
personally, but they are aware of the existence of the established crime network. The
people participating in illegal imports include importers of goods, border and customs
officials, and authorities on communal, regional and national level. Someone
involved in political life is also necessarily included, since such people secure the
administrative comfort to the others and act as the final recipients and redistributors
of the collected bribes.
Within such a scheme, the monthly amount of bribes can reach up to several hun-
dred thousand leva and can cause losses to the state budget, amounting to 50 percent
of the unpaid state revenues, depending on the particular type of imported goods. 
The functioning of such well-organized schemes for smuggling and other customs
violations threatens entire branches of the economy and creates substantial social ten-
sions. People at the top of such schemes have numerous means to use their influence,
including personnel selection in the law-enforcing and law-protecting structures of
the state.
2. In some corruption schemes, groups of people who know each other are
involved. Such small organized groups operate in particular region or on the territo-
ry of one or two regional customs directions. The people involved in the scheme
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include an importer, former or present customs officials, and former or present
Ministry of Interior officials. 
Bribes range between one and ten thousand leva. The functioning of such schemes
creates immoral personnel atmosphere and generates losses to the state budget
amounting to 30 percent of the sums, which should be paid into the budget. 
3. Corruption schemes, involving individual customs officials, border police-
men, sanitary and veterinary workers, officials collecting road taxes and issuing
various permits are created within the customs departments at the borders. In
exchange for money, officials involved in such schemes let certain goods pass through
the border without registering them. In other words, these are the cases of the so-
called outright smuggling, which causes huge losses to the state budget and creates
favorable conditions for illegal traffic with banned substances and goods. Bribes range
from 3,000 leva for a ten-ton truck to 10,000 leva for a twenty-ton truck. 
4. Individual corruption schemes function within the customs departments in the
interior of the country. In such schemes, a customs officer establishes a relation with
one or more companies – importers of goods, and assists them in the customs viola-
tions, leading to 10 to 30 percent losses in the customs duties collection. The bribe
depends on the location of the customs department and on the position of the cus-
toms official, and varies between 1,000 and 5,000 leva. Very often such violations are
realized with the knowledge of the direct superior, who receives a share of the bribe
as reward for his passive involvement.
5. Some customs officials create individual or group corruption schemes, in which
they conduct actions often bordering to extortion. They imitate exaggeratedly strict
observation of nonexistent procedures, and then face the importer with demands that
cannot be justified by any legislative norms and blackmail the importer on psycho-
logical basis, threatening to conduct a thorough physical inspection of the goods. In
such cases, the bribes range from 20 to 200 leva and have exceptionally negative
impact on the relations between business people and customs administration. On first
sight, there are no fiscal consequences for the state budget, but certain investigators
believe that about 60 percent of the customs officials are involved in such practices
through which they receive undeclared and thus untaxed revenues. 
6. The same is true for individual manifestations of corruption, connected with
speedy procedures and customs clearances of goods belonging to companies owned
by friends and relatives. Bribes reach up to 100 leva. In such cases, mistakes in the
procedure are often made and sometimes preconditions are created for unchecked
traffic of banned goods like drugs and weapons, without the involved customs official
being aware of it.
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Table 1: General classification of smuggling and related to it corruption
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Main actors Type of illegal activity Consequences
1. Large organized groups, 
operating on national level 
(Most of the involved do not 
know each other, but are aware 
of the organization. Its leaders 
have the power to influence the 
personnel selection in law-
enforcing institutions.) 
Bribes: from 10,000 to 50,000 
USD per month.
Importer à customs official at the border 
à representative of border authority à 
Ministry of Interior officials, securing the 
transit to the customs bureau in the interior 
à customs bureau in the interior à 
representative of the communal authority 
à representative of the high-level authority 
à political person (or person with influence 
on politics), providing administrative 
comfort to the others and the final recipient 
and distributor of the bribes.
5% of officials
Threatens entire branches of the 
economy. Creates social tensions. Casts 
suspicion on the public contract. 
Losses of the state budget: up to 50% 
depending on the type of the goods.
2. Small organized groups
Operate in particular region or 
in one or two regional customs 
bureaus. 
Bribes: up to 5,000 USD per 
month.
Importer à former or present high-ranking 
customs official à head of customs 
department à former or present Ministry of 
Interior official (neutralizes the inconvenient 
officials or informs on inspections) à 
operative inspector.
10% of officials
Creates immoral personnel atmosphere. 
Causes corrupt behavior among business 
people. Has a negative impact on foreign 
investors. 
Losses of the state budget: five million leva 
and more (up to 30%)
3. Type "Tandem" (Customs 
official and another employee 
at the border crossing).
Bribes: 1,500 USD for a ten-ton 
truck and 5,000 USD for a 
twenty-ton truck.
So-called "wild smuggling" à goods pass 
without being registered by the customs à 
"opened barriers."
10% of officials
Creates conditions for smuggling of 
banned goods (drugs, weapons).
4. Individual operations: officials 
from any operative department. 
In most cases involves customs 
inspectors. 
Bribes: depends on the type of 
the customs department and 
the position of the official; up to 
2,500 USD monthly.
Importer à customs official (in many cases 
with the passive involvement of the 
superior).
20% of officials
One to ten companies-importers pay 10 
to 30% lower taxes. Due to some changes 
in the tax legislation (VAT, profit tax), the 
practice is diminishing.
5. Individual operations: 
customs inspector or superior 
on the lower level. 
Bribes: 20 to 200 leva per 
month. 
Too strict observation of non-existing 
procedures, demands without foundation in 
the Law, threat of thorough inspection of 
the goods, blackmailing on psychological 
basis.
60% of officials.
No fiscal consequences for the budget. 
Exceptionally negative consequences on 
the business people. Creates negative 
image of the administration. 
1.2. CLASSIFICATION OF SMUGGLING ACCORDING TO THE TYPES OF GOODS
What follows is a classification according to the types of smuggled goods, includ-
ing the information on their origin and routes on which they are transported, the
range of bribes paid to officials involved in the illegal import, the quantities and val-
ues of the smuggled goods, and the type of fraud used for the illegal import.
Table 2: Smuggling according to the types of goods
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1. Petrol products
Type of goods Origin, route Bribes Quantity/value of smuggled goods Type of fraud
Romania – Ruse. 
Varna – Lesport 
Neftohim
100,000 leva per 
barge (3,000 – 
5,000 tons)
30-35% of general 
consumption
Export declarations from 
Romania; 
Part of the cargo is hidden
2. Household 
appliances
Thessaloniki – 
Kulata – internal 
customs bureaus
Roughly 10,000 
leva per truck
20 trucks per 
month
They are taxed as different 
goods
3. Electronics 
(chips, plates, etc)
USA, EU – airport 
Sofia
30% of unpaid VAT $ 3-5 million Shipping agents are involved in 
smuggling 
4. Airplane cargo China, Dubai – 
airport Sofia
1.5 leva / kg 40-100 tons 
monthly
5. Turkish goods 
(not counting food 
products)
Turkey (Istanbul) – 
Kapitan Andreevo – 
internal customs 
bureaus; Istanbul – 
free zones – 
internal customs 
bureaus – Plovdiv, 
Haskovo
Kapitan Andreevo – 
500 leva;
internal customs 
bureau – 1,000 leva
150 trucks per 
month
Untrue weight is declared; false 
receipts; false origin certificates; 
free zone Svilengrad; precise 
quantity and type of goods is not 
specified in documents, but only 
the number of boxes
6. Chinese and 
other Asian goods
China, Vietnam, 
India, etc.
Thessaloniki – 
Kulata – internal 
customs bureaus; 
Thessaloniki – 
Novo Selo – 
Plovdiv – Kazanluk; 
Varna
Border crossing – 
500 leva;
Internal customs 
bureau – 1,500 leva 
for trucks with 
canvas coverage;  
2,000 leva for 3 
containers (2 trucks)
200 containers per 
month on average
Considerable discrepancies in 
weight quoted in documents 
and in reality. False origin 
certificates (Turkish)
7. Consumer goods  
from Dubai
Dubai – customs 
free zone Syria – 
Svilengrad – 
internal bureaus 
Sofia, Plovdiv
Border crossings – 
500 leva;
Internal customs 
bureaus – 1,500 
leva
200 trucks per 
month
False origin certificates (mostly 
Turkish); transported in trucks 
with canvas coverage
1.2.1. PETROL PRODUCTS, LIQUID FUELS, 
NATURAL GAS, OILS
The market for petrol products is the
largest in the country with a value of 1-1.4
billion leva. According to official data of the
Customs Agency, 350 tons of liquid fuel
enters the country every day. The smug-
gling of petrol products, as well as the num-
ber of various forms of customs violations
and fiscal offences, connected to it, has
substantially decreased in the last three-
four years. Yet, experts analyzing the cur-
rent situation believe that 30 to 35 percent
of general consumption in Bulgaria is still
"gray" or even "black." 3
3 According to independent sources within the customs administration, budget losses come to around
500,000 leva daily as a consequence of that.
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8. Fruits and 
vegetables
Turkey, Syria, 
Macedonia – 
clearance in 
Svilengrad, 
Zlatarevo, Sofia
1,000 leva on 
average, divided 
among customs, 
sanitary control, 
police, traffic 
police, hygiene-
epidemiology 
institute, regional 
bureau for 
combating 
organized crime
240 trucks between 
October and May  
and 20 trucks from 
Syria
Transportation of poultry and 
meat instead of vegetables in 
some trucks
9. Meat and poultry Thessaloniki – 
Kulata – Sofia; 
EU – Vidin – Sofia; 
EU – Kalotina – 
Sofia; 
Black Sea ports
Border crossings + 
veterinary controls 
– 800-1000 leva;
Internal bureau – 
2500-3000 leva for 
customs officials + 
500-1000 leva for 
veterinary control
250 refrigerator 
trucks per month
Producer is not indicated on the 
trucks; false certificates, false EU 
export declarations
10. Milk powder Ukraine, Russia – 
Ruse, Kardam
4,000 leva per truck False certificates from Poland; 
pure profit $10-12,000 per truck
11. Rice, beans, 
lentils
Varna
10-20,000- ton 
ships
$19-20,000 per ship 2 ships loaded with 
rice per month  
Part of cargo is hidden; 
concealed origin
BULGARIA
Sofia
Bourgas
ROMANIA
BLACK
SEA
TURKEY
Istanbul
2000
267, 402 ,684 lv 91 ,420, 55 2 lv 179, 810 ,186lv 
2001
1999
Source: Customs Agency
Chart 1: Comparison of value of imported petrol products 
(in Bulgarian leva) for the period 1999-2001
Illegal import of petrol products, fuels and oils4 therefore generates the largest
losses to the stage budget. If we compare data for legally imported petrol products
for the last three years, substantial differences can be observed (see chart 1).
According to the operative data from the customs statistics, there was an unprece-
dented drop in the petrol import in the first six months of 2002, although there was
no registered drop in the consumption on the internal market in this same period (see
table 3)
Table 3: Comparison of the value of imported petrol products (in Bulgarian leva) by quarter
The official explanation offered was that the drop was the result of the fall of the
value of US dollar (the value of fuels is measured in dollars, unlike the value of other
goods, which is measured in euros). The second reason given was that Naftex has sus-
pended its imports. 
In the meantime, new facilitated procedures for customs control of import of liq-
uid petrol products were introduced. The demand for a thorough laboratory analysis
of all imported fuels was abolished. According to the new customs management, such
demand created preconditions for corruption, since it delayed the customs clearance
of imported fuel. The importers, who wished to deliver the fuel to the market as soon
as possible, were often ready to speed up the procedure through bribery. The new
regulations require analysis only in cases where the abuse of the tariff number would
be profitable. Analysis is conducted also if there is reliable intelligence information for
a possible fraud, when dealing with a company, which has violated the law in the
past, if the importer is a new name in the business, if unusual transport route was
used, etc. 
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4 Smuggling and customs fraud with petrol products have a long history. Petrol products have become
the most popular objects of smuggling at the beginning of the 1990s. Preconditions for such develop-
ment were created by the lifting of the state monopoly on import, export and retail trade of petrol
products (during the period 1991-1993, the number of petrol stations has doubled). An additional cat-
alyst for smuggling of fuel was the introduction of embargo on import of petrol products to Serbia and
Montenegro. This has increased profits from trade in petrol products three or four times as compared
to the previous petrol consumption in the country. Both the ordinary citizens living in border areas
and the economic groups, patronized by politicians, got engaged in fuel smuggling. Embargo on
Yugoslavia was one of the most important factors, influencing the growth of organized crime in the
country. After the end of the embargo regime, the established channels continued to operate under
new conditions. This was possible because of the subsequent political and economic crisis, privatiza-
tion chaos and different prices of petrol products in various Balkan countries. As a consequence, from
mid-1990s until present, the market with petrol products, fuels and oils remained a suitable environ-
ment for realization of illegal import, in which criminal groups and companies, operating within the
different "shades of gray" are involved.
Petrol products – first 
quarter
1999 2000 2001 2002
27,217,097 34,183,808 58,311,141 16,018,630
Petrol products – second 
quarter 
24,481,056 81,991,287 52,973,198 25,541,868
Petrol products – half-
year period
51,698,153 116,175,095 111,284,339 41,560,498
Source: Customs Agency
According to the data from the customs, in the first six months of 2002, the rev-
enues from fuel import were 320 million leva. The largest part of this sum comes from
VAT (290 million leva), followed by the excise tax (20.8 million). Most of the fuels are
imported from the countries to which Bulgaria applies no tariffs for import of petrol
products. Revenues from this item are therefore less than 2 million leva. Six million
leva were received by the State Road Network Fund and 646,848 leva by the
Preservation of Natural Environment Fund. Among all fuels, listed in Chapter 27 of the
customs tariff, propane-butane is of primary importance for the budget. The state col-
lects on average between 3.5 and 5.5 million leva monthly from its import. Diesel fuel
is on the second place with one to three million leva monthly, followed by the
unleaded gasoline A-95 and the low-weighted oils.
The customs analyses show that statistical value of imported propane-butane fell
from 0.56 leva per kilogram in January 2002 to 0.42 leva per kilogram in June 2002.
This anomaly is explained by the fact that propane-butane currently imported is of
inferior quality, which is a result of the market demand for cheaper fuel. The most
typical customs fraud regarding illegal import of propane-butane is the falsely
declared weight, since it is practically impossible to determine it accurately. The cus-
toms duties can be reduced also be declaring a wrong proportion of propane and
butane. 
The most common customs violations involving diesel fuel are linked to the tariff
number. The difference in customs duty rate makes it very profitable to declare diesel
as heavy fuel. Heavy fuels are cheaper and the excise tax is almost five times lower –
for diesel fuel it is 110 leva per ton, while for heavy fuels it is only 25 leva per ton. The
two types of fuel can be distinguished only by laboratory analysis (diesel contains 0.2
percent of sulfur, while heavy fuels contain between 1 and 2.8 percent). In cases of
such violations, false documents are usually used – most often false quality certifi-
cates.
Customs experts have concluded that violators often declare the imported diesel
fuel as industrial gas oil. Gas oil has the same excise rate as diesel, but is cheaper and
no road tax is levied on it. For diesel, the road tax is 180 leva per ton. It is difficult to
distinguish between both types of fuel, the only difference being the sulfur percent-
age in their composition.
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Ecology taxes are also highly differentiated, but they are relatively low and do not
lead to abuses.
Most types of gasoline are levied with the same (most often zero) import duties. It
is not possible to import leaded gasoline and to declare it as unleaded (which has a
lower excise tax), since the two types can be easily distinguished from each other with
a simple litmus test. The most common frauds therefore involve false documents.5
The biggest problem with widespread cases of frauds with documents is that the
customs authorities can follow only those duties and taxes paid on their accounts.
Revenues from VAT and excise taxes are under jurisdiction of tax authorities, ecolog-
ical tax is collected by the Ministry of Environment and Water, and road tax by the
Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works. Customs authorities cannot
check whether certain taxes have indeed been paid to the respective accounts (so far,
the tax authorities have refused to share the information, claiming to be legally bound
not to disclose it). The Customs Agency has therefore suggested that a general
transit account be established, so they could follow which state claims have been
actually paid.
Another priority task is the termination of another practice, harming the budget –
the petrol stations on the border crossings and in the free zones. The most typical case
is the petrol station Shipka in the Free Zone Svilengrad.6
Another problem is the large number of illegal or unlawfully operating petrol sta-
tions. According to information from Petrol, there are over 2,500 sites for retail trade
with fuel in the country. About 440 petrol stations are owned by Petrol, sixty by
LUKoil, and Shell and OMV own another sixty each. The share of small petrol stations
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5 Three cases were discovered in 2002. A scheme for import of fuel with false payment orders for VAT,
excise tax, ecological tax and road tax in the value of 1.6 million leva was uncovered in the customs
department Ruse in May. In March, an attempt to import nine cisterns of A-95 gasoline with false cus-
toms declarations, supposedly issued by the customs department Gorublyane, was prevented on the
railway station Gara Iskar. The cisterns contained 450 tons of gasoline, and should have been levied
with 300,000 leva of duties and taxes. Around 20 truck-cisterns were waiting near Sofia to reload the
fuel and disappear with it somewhere in the country. In a separate incident in June in Stara Zagora,
importers of another nine cisterns of A-95 gasoline submitted payment orders to the customs bureau,
but annulled them in the midst of the procedure. 
The highest taxes are levied on gasoline A-98, but since this type is imported in limited quantities,
most frauds involve A-95. Nevertheless there have been cases with smuggling of A-98. In some of
them, the following tricks were used: a cistern with A-98 was sunk into cheaper industrial oil, or the
fuel was smuggled in hidden additional reservoirs on the trucks, transporting other goods. 
6 According to information from sources linked to the petrol business, the budget loses 3.8 million leva
monthly because of this petrol station due to unpaid VAT, excise tax, road tax and ecological tax. This
sum equals the revenues from the overall monthly import of propane-butane for the entire country.
The petrol station is legal, since refuelling on petrol stations located on border crossings and in free
zones is considered export. The excise tax is therefore refunded and no VAT is charged. Because of
the presumption that the fuel is sold "abroad," ecological and road tax are also not levied. As a result,
Shipka sells the diesel fuel for 0.70 leva per liter. The price at the petrol stations in the interior of the
country is 1.20 leva per liter. The state therefore loses around 500 leva (170 leva VAT, 110 leva excise
tax, 180 leva road and ecological tax) from every ton of diesel, sold in the free zone. Free market com-
petition also suffers. According to information from the petrol business, Shipka sells the impressive 350
tons or more daily (the owner claims that they sell around 200 tons). Most of the clients are Bulgarian
drivers, who do not exit the country after refuelling. Truck drivers are also taking advantage of the
lower price and often resell the fuel in Bulgaria, Turkey or Greece. Most trucks have additional reser-
voirs and can carry hundreds of litres of diesel. A Turkish businessman owns similar petrol stations on
the border crossings Kalotina and Vidin.
has already reached 35 percent. On some of these, fuel is sold directly from the cis-
terns, and in most cases, less than 10,000 leva were invested in their construction.
Lately, numerous makeshift "petrol stations" have appeared, run by people who are
most likely members of "power groups". Fuel is pumped with hoses straight from the
cisterns and sold at prices lower than those on the near-by petrol stations. Some of
the clients even have special "membership" cards. 
Such sites do not require much investment (unlike the real petrol stations into
which around one million leva has to be invested), and no taxes are paid to the state.
Most often, the fuel sold at such sites has been illegally imported. As a result, it can
be sold at much lower price. In Sofia, for example, there are three or four such places,
where diesel is sold for 0.95 to 1.00 leva per liter, and gasoline for 1.15 to 1.20 leva
per liter. This phenomenon is widespread in northern Bulgaria due to the illegal
import from Romania. In Ruse, for example, in some places propane-butane is sold
for 500 leva for a ton, as compared to 625-685 leva for a ton of the regularly import-
ed gas with all duties and taxes being paid. According to estimates of official traders,
if only 10 percent of the small traders (representing 35 percent of the petrol market)
do not play by the rules, budget loses about 100 million leva per year from unpaid
VAT, excise and other taxes. 
The existence of small illegal petrol stations is possible because the European tech-
nical and ecological standards and norms have still not been introduced and the con-
struction of petrol stations is allowed on all possible places. There are too many play-
ers on the petrol market. In order to survive, they have to lower their prices, which
they do by using illegal means. The weak fiscal control is assisting them in this respect.
All this creates problems to the companies operating legally, decreases their capabil-
ities for investment into new infrastructure, as well as for expanding and improving
their services. It also brings their profits down, according to some claims, almost to
zero.
Currently, petrol products and liquid fuels are imported from Russia, Ukraine,
Romania, Greece, Turkey, etc. The customs clearance of these goods is centered at
the customs departments in Ruse, Kulata, Stara Zagora, Sofia and Burgas. The main
violations include declarations of lower values, incorrect description, citation of an
incorrect tariff number, concealment of actual weight, falsification of payment docu-
ments, falsification of laboratory examination protocols. The most flagrant form of
smuggling – the so-called "outright smuggling" is also conducted, as can be judged
from the information regarding the illegal import of three to five tons of fuel in the
vicinity of the port Lesport - Varna. Sums, offered as bribes, are very different, due
to the various extents of the illegal imports, but can reach as high as 100,000 leva
for a ship in the case of outright smuggling. The bribes are divided between vari-
ous officers, engaged in the concealment of the illegal import.
Smuggling of petrol products through Kulata has started again. Truck-cisterns,
which are not registered at all when entering the country, are involved in the scheme
– this therefore is another case of outright smuggling. A bribe of 15,000 leva is paid
for each cistern. There is no information regarding the precise number of cisterns
imported in such a way. The channels through Ruse and Varna also continue to oper-
ate.
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1.2.2. AUTOMOBILES 
When making an assessment of the gray and black market with automobiles in the
country, a specific feature of the Bulgarian car market should be kept in mind. Unlike
most of the other Eastern European countries, Bulgaria does not have its own car pro-
duction and is completely dependent on import. According to statistical data, the
import could conditionally be divided into two categories – import of new and import
of used cars. Data from operative customs statistics show that the market with used
cars valued 250-300 million leva in 2001. The value of the annual market of new cars
ranges from 200 to 250 million leva. The overall car market in the country therefore
reaches around 500 million leva annually and is one of the largest in Bulgaria.
Table 4: Comparison of the value of import of used and new automobiles (in Bulgarian
leva) for the period 1991-2001
The new cars represent only 10 percent of the overall number of cars sold in
Bulgaria in the last 12 years (between 12,000 and 14,000 automobiles are sold annu-
ally). There are almost no customs violations involving the import of new cars. One
reason for this is the control, exercised by large car companies over their distributors’
networks and logistics, and the second is the control the Bulgarian companies,
involved in import of new cars, practice over their competitors. Due to the small size
of the market, such companies can follow every sale made by the competition.7
The situation regarding the import of used cars is very different. The data shows
that in the last 10 years, more than one million cars were imported, with the average
annual import being about 100,000 cars in the last three years. Used cars therefore
occupy the central place on the Bulgarian car market.8 The used cars market is well
developed, with companies specialized in particular types and classes of cars, with
permanent partners all over the world, with specialized transport facilities, with
numerous service-stations and with an "exclusive right" on a particular part of the
country. Despite the lack of systemized information, it is obvious that the market is
large enough for the big importers (100-300 cars annually), medium-sized importers
(30-40 cars) and for private persons, importing 2-3 cars a year.9 According to the offi-
cial customs statistics, the market for used cars in 2001 can be estimated at roughly
22 CSD Reports 11
7 Although customs violations are rare with the import of new cars, some of the large distributors
expressed fear that some of the smaller distributors might try to avoid paying the necessary taxes.
8 Unlike other states, where new cars represent one of the main indicators of the state of the economy,
in Bulgaria this role is played by used cars.
9 According to the critics, the Bulgarian market is one of those, serving the important economic func-
tion in the EU countries – it is "opening" space for new consumption and is "cleaning away" the aged
cars.
Number of imported used 
cars
1999 2000 2001
91,501 85,116 103,968
Number of imported new 
cars
11,958 13,069 13,365
Value of imported private 
cars and other motor 
vehicles for transport of 
passengers
386,733,786 404,539,599 518,672,584
Type of motor vehicle
Source: Customs Agency
250-300 million leva. This sum, however, represents only 40-50 percent of the real
value of cars. 
Although the system for import of old cars functions since 1990, there have been
no substantial changes in its operation since 1993-94. Due to the specific nature of the
car trade, the concentration and monopoly of the large companies is impossible. This
creates conditions for the existence of one of the largest "gray markets" in the coun-
try.10
As we can see in table 5, the profits from the sales of used cars are constantly
increasing (if we consider that no change has occurred in the market with new cars,
the revenues from the sale of used cars have been increasing by 25 percent annually
on average since 1999). 
Table 5: Comparison of the value of car imports (in Bulgarian leva) by quarter
One of the most important factors regarding the Bulgarian gray market is the
exceptionally liberal law on import of old automobiles. One of the simplest systems
for imposing customs duties on used cars is used - the duty is not calculated accord-
ing to price of the car, but according to power of its engine.11 This in principle should
not stimulate the "gray import." Yet, in practice this market generates huge losses to
the state.
There are numerous ways to conceal the real information about the imported car
in order to reduce the due payments. Such scams are used both by individual
importers and by companies. Usually powerful and luxurious cars are imported by
taking advantage of the right of disabled persons to the reduction of customs duties.
10 "Gray schemes" start in Western Europe, where used cars are considered to be inferior goods. They
are therefore of no interest either to large trans-national companies, or to the state administration. As
a result, used cars can easily fall into the shadow channels in which the real value of the car is trans-
formed into the value, presented to the customs and tax authorities of the country where these "infe-
rior goods" are imported.
11 When the state is not interested in the price of the imported car, the money spent for the purchase
remains abroad. As a consequence, the limitations for the import of used cars to Bulgaria are only
symbolic. In South America, for instance, a similar policy is usually considered a "legalization of smug-
gling of used cars."
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Private cars and other 
motor vehicles for 
transport of passengers – 
first quarter
1999 2000 2001 2002
51,018,084 86,768,916 95,472,505 138,500,690
Private cars and other 
motor vehicles for 
transport of passengers – 
second quarter
83,651,025 101,408,443 126,138,123 122,135,389
First half-year 134,669,109 188,177,359 221,610,628 260,636,079
Type of MV
Source: Customs Agency
According to some estimates, around 15,000 cars are imported in such way every
year.12
Liberalization of the import of used cars has created a gigantic gray market for
spare parts and accessories for the cars (it represents 70-80 percent of the overall mar-
ket). With 100,000 used cars imported annually and with the enormous gray import
of spare parts, it is not a problem for a specialized criminal group to conceal up to
20,000 cars, stolen within the country or in some other European state.13
The transit of stolen cars (stolen
outside, but sometimes also inside
Bulgaria) through Bulgaria to third
countries also continues to take place.
Most of these cars end up in Russia, other
former Soviet republics, and the Arab
countries. The main such channel runs
through Kapitan Andreevo, Turkey and
Georgia. In Georgia, cars are redistrib-
uted towards Russia and other countries.
Direct export for Russia is conducted
through other, smaller border crossings,
which, unlike Kapitan Andreevo, are not
equipped with electronic information
systems, directly connecting Bulgarian
and Russian insurance companies. This
connection makes it possible to instantly
exchange information regarding stolen
vehicles (in most cases, insurance fraud is
involved, with the owner of the vehicle
being involved in the alleged "theft").
The bribes between 2,500 and 3,000 leva (depending on the type of the car) are
paid to customs and border police officials in Kapitan Andreevo. Usually, the person
driving the stolen car is registered as a passenger, transiting the border on foot or in
some other transport vehicle, and the car itself is not registered at all. 
In the fall of 2002, corrupt officials at the border crossing Zlatarevo were caught
after letting a stolen jeep to pass the border unregistered. The investigation revealed
that the two corrupt border policemen have taken part in similar activities in the past,
taking bribes between 2,000 and 5,000 leva, depending on the type and price of a
particular car.14
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12 Such practice has been recently terminated with stricter regulation of the described privilege, which
can now be applied only for cars with engine volume below 1600 cubic centimetres.
13 Police statistics show that between 600 and 800 cars are stolen in Bulgaria every month. This number
should be increased by 30 to 40 percent to include cars, which were stolen, but the theft was not
reported to the police, because owners preferred to pay the ransom in order to get the car back.
14 The two border policemen usually noted in the documentation that drivers of the cars entered the
country on foot. On the Macedonian side, however, the same persons were registered as traveling in
a car. Furthermore, on every crossing, a different car was registered. Some of the stolen cars have
passed directly through the VIP section of the border crossing. The policemen knew in advance the
type and the registration number of the car and let it pass without even checking the documents of
the driver. (See 168 chasa, September 6-12, 2002.)
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Chart 2: International channels for trade in
stolen cars
Every month, more than 1,000 car insurance frauds are conducted in the coun-
try. Unfortunately, there are no accurate statistics how many of these cars have
left the country in such a way.
1.2.3. HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES15
Data from market research show that from 1991 to 1994, profits from the sales of
household appliances were larger than profits from sales of any other group of goods.
An average Bulgarian household could not afford to buy a car in the first years of the
1990s. In contrast, almost 50 percent of Bulgarian families took advantage of the flood
of cheap imitations of various well-known brands of household appliances, but also
of the import of genuine high-quality products. The subsequent economic and polit-
ical crisis and the period of stagnation led to a large contraction of the market for such
goods. 
The gray as well as the illegal import of household appliances should also be
viewed in the context of economic stagnation. As a consequence of the reduced
demand, such import is currently 60 to 70 percent smaller than it was 5 or 6 years ago.
Additional reasons for such development are the appearance of hyper-market chains,
the establishment of the specialized technical markets, and the tendency of large pro-
ducers to create their own distribution networks. The market for household appli-
ances is highly fragmented. It is shared by large companies, importing on regular basis
and owning developed trading networks, and by medium and small companies,
importing periodically (depending on the situation). In contrast to the early 1990s,
participation of suitcase traders is negligible.
Despite the reduction in consumption, the large profits realized with this type of
goods continue to attract traders. Experts estimate that around 20 trucks of household
appliances are illegally imported every month. The most frequently used fraud is the
declaration of entirely different goods (spare parts, motor cutters, etc) with lower cus-
toms duties, VAT and excise tax. The most typical route used is from Thessaloniki
through Kulata to Sofia. The budget loss is around 10,000 leva from each truck.
Analyses show that both small companies and large market chains are involved in
such channels.
One of the popular "explanations" offered to conceal import frauds is that the
declared price is low because the goods are second-hand. At the end of 1990s, the
market for second-hand household appliances sharply increased. As a consequence,
it became very difficult to disclose the illegal import of the new household appliances,
and the import of the counterfeits, imitating the quality brands, especially if the
importers were smaller companies.
Considering the stated above, it becomes clear why it is very difficult to make an
assessment of the gray sector for household appliances. If the operative customs data
for import and data on annual sales, registered by marketing research, is compared,
15 The customs officials divide household appliances into four groups, using special jargon names. "Small
white" appliances include irons, hair-dryers, mixers, electric shavers and other small electric devices.
"Large white" appliances include washing machines, refrigerators, dishwashers, water-heaters and
other large household appliances. "Small black" appliances include transistors, walkmans, head-
phones, etc. "Large black" appliances are TV sets, stereos, video-recorders and video-players, cam-
eras, DVD and CD players, etc.
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approximate estimations can be made. According to marketing research, the value of
the "white" household appliances market is between 140 and 170 million leva. As it
can be seen in Table 6, customs duties have been levied only on 50-60 percent of the
imported "white" household appliances. Although the customs data show that cus-
toms revenues have increased, this tendency does not have a constantly rising char-
acter.
Table 6: Comparison of the value of import of "white" household appliances (in Bulgarian leva) 
for the period 1999-200116
The annual sales of the "black" household appliances are estimated to be between
60 and 80 million leva. It is believed that gray imports represent 40-50 percent. 
1.2.4. COMPUTER AND ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT
Operative customs statistics show the annual increase of 12-15 percent in the col-
lection of revenues from the legal import of this type of goods (see table 7).17 Another
point of view is given by the Bulgarian and the international market estimates, which
show that the Bulgarian market for computer and electronics equipment is expand-
ing with a much slower pace.
Table 7: Comparison of the value of import of computer and electronics equipment 
(in Bulgarian leva) for the period 1999-2001
A special attention should be given to goods imported with the air transport. These
mostly include various electronic parts (like chips and plates). The monthly value of
imports is between 3 and 5 million USD. The most frequently used fraud is the dec-
laration of the lower customs rate, with bribes comprising roughly 30 percent of the
26 CSD Reports 11
16 The household appliances included in this measurement do not include all appliances, which could
be considered "small" or "large white" household appliances. Despite this, the data is representative
enough, since around 90 percent of such goods are included. Due to the lack of appropriate data,
there is no similar table for the "black" household appliances.
17 Data in the table covers only part of goods, falling in this category. It nevertheless offers insight into
the developments, concerning the import of computer and electronics components.
"Large white" appliances 
Household refrigerators, cooking ovens, microwave 
ovens, water-heaters, etc.
1999 2000 2001
46,326,026 44,646,056 57,308,028
"Small white" appliances  
Electric irons, toasters, electric barbecues, deep 
fryers, coffee machines, etc.
11,433,984 10,549,589 12,981,184
Type of household appliances 
Source: Customs Agency
Printers and other equipment and accessories for 
computers and other data processing machines, 
etc.
1999 2000 2001
78,886,154 91,249,752 103,059,491
Source: Customs Agency
unpaid duties. Most of such imports travel from the EU and the USA to the airport
Sofia. The shipping agents, owning warehouses on the airport Sofia, are involved in
the illegal import.
The large international companies are trying to limit the "gray imports." The main
violators are found in the so-called SOHO (Small Office / Home Office) market, since
most consumers prefer distributors, who do not add VAT to the price of the product.
1.2.5. CIGARETTES 
Due to their specific features (small size, high price, very large consumption), cig-
arettes are the most popular item for smuggling not only in Bulgaria, but also in
most of the world. The profits made by the cigarette smugglers are close to those,
made by the drug smugglers. The volume of cigarette smuggling in Bulgaria can be
most accurately determined if the data from customs statistics are compared with the
data from marketing research on the sales of imported cigarettes in the country.
According to the latter, the annual cigarette market in the country can be estimated
at 500-560 million leva.18 The imported cigarettes represent 12-15 percent of all ciga-
rettes sold (60-80 million leva).
Table 8: Comparison of the value of cigarette import (in Bulgarian leva) for the period 1999-2001
Based on these estimates, the experts
of Coalition 2000 calculated that in 1999,
less than 10 percent of imported ciga-
rettes, sold in Bulgaria, were imported
legally. In the period 2000-2001, the share
of legally imported cigarettes19 sharply
increased (see Table 8), although the con-
sumption remained unchanged. 
However, the legally imported ciga-
rettes still represent only 30 percent of for-
eign cigarettes, sold in the country (see
chart 3).
Several factors have influenced this
development. Among the most important
is the new approach of the large multi-
national companies. Few of them planned
to participate in the privatization of the
Bulgarian tobacco giant Bulgartabak and
as a consequence, they tried to legalize
18 The estimate of the National Statistics Institute is lower – 260-280 million leva annually.
19 The problems involving cigarettes produced in Bulgaria are not going to be discussed here. They
include import of raw materials and sub-products, fictive export involving VAT frauds, and illegal
export to third countries, without duties and taxes being paid there.
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Cigarettes
1999 2000 2001
1,647,554 3,927,872 5,040,808
Source: Customs Agency
BULGARIA
Sofia
ROMANIA
BLACK 
SEA
1999
10%
90%
2000-2001
30%
70%
Legal Import
TURKEY
Illegal Import
Source: Customs Agency
Chart 3: Market for imported cigarettes
1999-2001
their products, sold in the country. The change in the behavior is also a result of many
international law suits against them on charges that the multinationals assist the smug-
gling of their products. Equally important is that the Bulgarian law-enforcing agencies
intensified their efforts in countering cigarette smuggling.
A new situation occurred in the early 2002. A clearly visible drop in revenues from
cigarette imports has occurred as compared with the same period in the previous two
years (see table 9).
Table 9: Comparison of the value of cigarette imports (in Bulgarian leva) by quarter
These changes could be connected with the retreat of the multi-national compa-
nies from privatization of Bulgartabak, as well as to the increase of the excise tax in
the beginning of the year. The fact that the situation within the customs has "calmed
down" has also enabled corrupt officials to reactivate the traditional smuggling chan-
nels. Certain part of the increase of the share of smuggled foreign brands on the mar-
ket is also a result of the higher price of Bulgarian cigarettes. Similar reasons are also
behind the fictive export of Bulgarian cigarettes through Kapitan Andreevo, where
bribes of about 15,000 USD are paid for every truck, carrying 900-960 boxes of ciga-
rettes.
Cigarettes are imported from countries like Switzerland, USA, Cuba, Austria, Great
Britain, Germany, Spain, Holland, Belgium, Macedonia, Turkey, Greece and Cyprus.
They enter Bulgaria through customs departments Svilengrad, Kulata, Sofia, Varna,
Burgas, Plovdiv and Kalotina. Mot often, the so-called method "seal," involving the
concealment of the entire shipments, is used.20 This method is used both for illegal
import and illegal export of cigarettes. After 2000, some of the people involved in the
old channels for illegal import of cigarettes started to use the traditional "Balkan chan-
nel" for export to Western Europe. According to the experts, this is because the
Bulgarian market for imported cigarettes is very small, and opportunities for enrich-
ment are much higher in countries like Great Britain, Germany and Italy.
Documentation is often "legalized" with false customs stamps. Usually, a ghost com-
pany is involved in such export.
Along with the traditional "political channels" and the outright smuggling involving
unregistered passage of trucks and various types of "seal" method, the impact of small
importers is also important. They frequently pass the border as suitcase traders, bring-
ing few stacks of cigarettes into the country each time. Not rarely, with the aid of a
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20 The smuggled goods are placed in the difficultly approachable inner part of the truck, while the
declared goods are used to conceal them.
Cigarettes – first quarter
1999 2000 2001 2002
47,579 92,723 350,535 424,575
Cigarettes – second 
quarter
653,212 1,187,044 1,350,195 577,065
Cigarettes – first half-year 700,791 1,279,767 1,700,730 1,001,640
Source: Customs Agency
customs official they are acquainted to, such suitcase traders import several master-
boxes of cigarettes and later sell them to retail traders.
One of the best established schemes involves duty-free shops. According to the
customs data, these magazines have paid around 60 million leva of excise taxes in
2001. This means that for 8 to 9 times more foreign cigarettes have been sold in duty-
free shops than within the country. Experts estimate that around two thirds of ciga-
rettes, sold in duty-free shops, are subsequently "re-exported" to Western Europe,
while the remaining third ends up on the Bulgarian market.
Unfortunately, the assessment of the fictive export of cigarettes cannot be con-
ducted at this point, due to the lack of data and the lack of proper method.
1.2.6. ALCOHOL
The market for imported alcohol beverages is one of the examples of a suc-
cessful limitation of illegal import in the last three years. In the first years of transi-
tion, the alcohol market was generating one of the highest profit rates. Before 1998,
between 80 and 100 million leva were made annually from the sales of the imported
quality spirits (in 1993, this sum was even 160 million leva). Of these, 90 percent rep-
resented either "black" (smuggling) or "gray imports" (with highly reduced declared
value). The precondition for such a devel-
opment was the liberalization of imports
in 1991. Enormous number of companies,
seeking quick accumulation of capital
entered the market for goods with fast cir-
culation. As usually, the most "effective"
method used was the outright smuggling.
If the operative customs statistics are com-
pared with the results of marketing
research, it becomes clear that only 8-10
percent of foreign spirits, sold in the coun-
try, were imported legally. In 1999, how-
ever, a sharp change occurred – the value
of the legally imported alcohol was 18.39
million leva, or 4.5 times more than the
previous year, without any visible change
in consumption. This tendency continued
in 2000, when despite the registered drop
in consumption, the revenues from
imported spirits increased by 12 percent
(see chart 4).
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Chart 4: Value of the import of spirits (in
Bulgarian leva) 1999-2001
Three major preconditions have helped bring about this change: 
First, the Law on Excise Duties was amended in December 1998. Thereafter
excise duty on spirits was determined on the basis of alcohol content, and not on the
declared value as it used to be until then. Thus excise duty no longer depended on
the declared import price and this rendered pointless the value-related fraudulent
schemes (the possibility to present false quantities remained). Under the new situa-
tion the correlation between profit and risk to the importer drastically shifted in favor
of legal activity. There was no longer any need for bribery in order to avoid payment
of, or to reduce customs duties.
The second precondition was the wish of the leading importers, mainly the major
multi-national companies, to conduct legal business in this country. In mid-1998,
these companies concluded that the market in Bulgaria is less risky and that they
could enter it legally. As a consequence, they started to "clean away" numerous gray
distributors of their products by ceasing to supply them. At the beginning of 2000,
almost all of the major producers of spirits had established their own offices in
Bulgaria or had designated official importers. The largest (United Distillers & Vintners
– UDV, Diageo, Allied Domecq and Seagram) begun to invest into the development
of the national distribution networks.
The third precondition is the improved work of customs authorities, which man-
aged to enhance control at the major points of entry for the import of quality spirits.
According to importers, smuggling of spirits became too risky and is likely to cease
completely.
The positive tendencies in the import of high-quality brands of alcohol should not
be overestimated. According to both experts and importers, lately there has been a
certain reorientation towards "parallel importers," which are most often of a semi-
legal nature.21 What is declared in this case is the type of beverage, rather than the
brand. In addition, the invoice value tends to be underestimated and under fixed cus-
toms and excise duty rates, the state is losing the VAT. In the estimates of the largest
spirits importer – UDV – under the market situation in 2000 and the presumed 30
percent illegal imports, the national budget has lost 4.2 million leva from unpaid VAT,
excise and customs duties, profit tax, and tax on advertising activity, while the losses
of authorized importers amount to 2.7 million leva.
According to the large importers, the situation began to deteriorate since the
early 2001. After reaching almost 80 percent in 2000, the legal import again started
to give way to "parallel imports." 
There are several reasons for this. First, as most market researches have shown, the
sales of imported quality spirits have decreased. The main reason for this develop-
ment is the reduced consumption power of the Bulgarian population. 
Second, the structure of sales has changed after the appearance of huge hyper-
market chains like Metro and Billa, and supermarkets like Fantastiko and Oasis. They
destroyed the previously existing structure, including large importers (UDV, Allied
Domecq, Seagram), huge warehouses and retail traders. After 2000, roughly 20 per-
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21 Import of counterfeit products of the major brands continues. Bulgaria has the "advantage" of prox-
imity to the countries, which are the most active produces of the counterfeit products – Turkey and
the Middle East.
cent of sales were conducted in hyper-markets, where both retail traders and con-
sumers are buying. Pressured by the reduced consumption and by the competition of
the hyper-markets, wholesale traders started to look for cheaper goods and some of
them started to develop parallel import on their own.22
Third, the importers blame the customs. Unlike the previous years, in 2001 sev-
eral old channels were reactivated. This was directly linked to the parliamentary
elections in June 2001. Unlike the summer of 2000, when Kulata was the only chan-
nel for illegal import of alcohol, in 2001 channels through Varna, Burgas and Kapitan
Andreevo were also used.
In 2002, two types of violations involving import of spirits can be indicated. The
first type is realized mainly through schemes for illegal import of small quantities,
exported through duty-free warehouses of official distributors and involving their
employees or people connected to them. Apart from small violators, a number of
large companies also use duty-fee warehouses as the main source for deliveries,
which seriously harms the budget. The Coalition 2000 estimates that about 30 per-
cent of imported alcohol passed through duty-free warehouses.
The second type of violations involves the so-called parallel import on reduced
prices. Apart from owners of large warehouses (see above), owners of night-bars, dis-
cotheques, etc, are also involved.
The share of the legally imported alcohol beverages has continued to increase
in 2002, despite the continued drop in consumption (see table 10). There are two
preconditions for this positive development. First, the concussions involving large
importers have ended and now the chain import – wholesale trade – retail trade
operates smoothly again. Second, after months of political insecurity in a large num-
ber of customs bureaus, the "parallel import" at reduced prices is no longer tolerated.23
Table 10: Comparison of the value of alcohol import (in Bulgarian leva) for the period 1999-2001
22 Gray imports were stimulated by the crisis of the UDV’s distributor Makkar. The change of the dis-
tributor and the ensuing legal proceedings facilitated gray imports of brands like Johnnie Walker, J&B,
and Smirnoff. 
23 It became very difficult to trace the violations. Until 2000, the comparison of customs statistics and
marketing researches could show the size of the "gray market." Now, this is almost impossible. The
"parallel importers" follow the prices of large importers, but later conceal part of the due VAT. At the
same time, small importers accuse multi-national companies to be importing at very low prices (and
consequently paying lower customs duties), and later concealing part of their profits. To reduce the
budget losses, a stricter control should be introduced along the entire chain from import to retail trade
for all importers.
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Ethyl alcohol – brandy, 
vodka, whisky – first 
quarter
1999 2000 2001 2002
3,222,759 4,855,733 4,001,538 5,304,149
Ethyl alcohol – brandy, 
vodka, whisky – second 
quarter
3,916,591 5,053,342 3,416,730 5,567,961
First half-year 7,139,350 9,909,075 7,418,268 10,872,110
Source: Customs Agency 
1.2.7. COFFEE
An average Bulgarian consumes 2.4 kilograms of coffee a year. Between 1,000 and
1,100 tons are consumed in the country per month,24 or 12,500 to 13,000 tons per
year. Given the average price of 10 leva for a kilogram of coffee, the annual market
can be estimated at 130 million leva (65 million USD).
The customs data shows that 19,000 tons of coffee was imported in 2001. Of this
quantity, between 15,600 and 18,000 tons were the raw coffee, and between 1,000
and 1,300 tons were packaged coffee. Some of the differences between the import-
ed and sold quantities can be explained by the losses incurred during the roasting of
coffee. (Some importers note that there are no accurate data for the so-called "off
premise market" – bars, cafes and restaurants, which also causes some distortions.)
Another explanation is that in the last three months of 2001, more coffee than usual
was imported, because it became known that the excise tax on coffee would be
raised. The large difference in coffee imports in 2000 and 2001, visible from the data
of customs statistics, confirms the thesis that importers oversupplied themselves
before the tax increase. In 2000, 14,000 tons were imported, and in 2001 19,000 tons
(see table 11).25
Table 11: Comparison of the value of coffee import (in Bulgarian leva) for the period 1999-2001
The prevailing opinion is that the largest customs and tax frauds in the coffee busi-
ness occur in the import of non-packaged coffee (around 25 percent of the market
according to the June 2002 data). The market for packaged coffee is covered by well-
known international companies like Kraft Foods and Elite, which operate legally.
Together with other similar companies, they hold around 70 percent of the market.
The remaining five percent covers soluble coffee. The leader in this sector is Nestle
Bulgaria with Nescafe, also operating legally. In the end of 2001, when new ways for
increasing budget revenues had to be found, the Ministry of Finance proclaimed that
it would curb the smuggling of non-packaged coffee and reduce it by 10 to 15 per-
cent by prohibiting the retail trade with such coffee, by changing the base on which
the excise tax is determined and by introducing excise banderoles. (Since 2001, the
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24 June 2002, BBSS Gallup (TNS)
25 The two largest importers of raw coffee are Kraft Foods, which in 2001 bought the former and the cur-
rent market champion Nova Brasilia (45 percent of coffee sold in Bulgaria in June 2002) from its pre-
vious Lebanese owners, and Elite Bulgaria (Israeli owned), producer of brand Elite (22 percent of the
market). The third large importer of coffee is Balkancam, which was in business since the early 1990s.
At the beginning, their brand was Santos Royal, but now they are marketing the brand Spetema. The
company is involved mostly in the wholesale trade and in its own production. Apart from these three,
there are also several smaller companies.
1999 2000 2001
Statistical 
value (leva)
Statistical 
value (leva
Statistical 
value (leva)
Coffee, including roasted coffee and coffee 
without caffeine; coffee shells
Net weight 
(kg)
Net weight 
(kg)
Net weight 
(kg)
19,397,619 27,236,687 29,708,18419,765,461 14,679,534 19,326,838
Value with added VAT and excise tax of 1.35 
leva/kg
56,218,809 57,405,951 68,075,287
Source: Customs Agency 
customs duties for import of coffee have a zero rate. Until then, they came to 30 per-
cent of the dutiable value.)
Subsequently, the Ministry of Finance set the excise tax as a fixed sum per kilo-
gram. Since the beginning of 2002, the excise tax for raw coffee is 1 lev per kilogram,
and for roasted coffee (regardless whether it is packaged or not) 1.3 leva par kilogram.
For coffee extracts, excise tax is 3.5 leva per kilogram and for granulated mixtures,
containing over 10 percent of coffee, tax is 1.3 leva per kilogram. After numerous
protests by owners of shops for non-packaged coffee and after lobbying by importers
of such coffee, the decision to prohibit retail trade with non-packaged coffee was not
adopted.
Tax experts claim that main violations in coffee trade occur during its import. Due
to the new way of taxing, two main types of customs frauds are especially attractive
– false declaration of quantity and abuse of the incorrect tariff position. Roasted cof-
fee is therefore declared as raw coffee, since it carries a lower excise tax. In the last
six months, only one case of customs fraud involving coffee became publicly known
– the import of 24 trucks of coffee, for which the importer paid 24 leva instead of
24,000 leva due to a dot he put instead of a comma between 24 and 000 (informa-
tion is from the newspaper Struma dnes and was not officially confirmed by the cus-
toms). In our opinion, the lack of registered attempts of such frauds shows that this
practice is well concealed and can be disclosed only through further cooperation
between customs and tax authorities.
Tax experts do not rule out cases of outright smuggling of coffee. This was prac-
ticed in the past and now, with excise tax being linked to the quantity, it is even more
attractive.26 The last officially disclosed case is from 30 September 2001. Two trucks,
which have left the country through Kulata and returned loaded with coffee without
this being registered, were discovered then. In the end of 2001 it also became clear
that there are significant differences between Greek and Bulgarian customs statistics
regarding the import through Kulata and Promakon. In two months (October and
November 2001), 5,500 tons of coffee were exported from Greece, but only 2,700
tons entered Bulgaria.27
The statistical value of imported coffee is 30 million leva. When VAT and the 1.35
leva per kilogram excise tax are added, this sum reaches 68 million leva. The coffee
traders do not wish to talk about how the profits are divided. According to the avail-
able information, importers of the raw coffee take 3-5 percent, producers 7-8 percent,
wholesale traders 5-7 percent and retail traders 15-20 percent of the price. For pack-
aged coffee, the division is as follows: importers around 15 percent, wholesale traders
3-5 percent, and retail traders 15-20 percent. 
26 An indirect proof that outright smuggling of coffee exists is the fact that the market prices of coffee
remained unchanged after the introduction of the new way of tax setting. The expectation was that
the price of expensive brands would fall, and the price of the cheap ones would rise. Nova Brasilia
and Elite raised prices for 6 to 7 percent, but the price of non-packaged coffee remained the same.
The traders’ explanation was first that they were still selling the coffee imported under the previous
tax regime, and later that they have covered the difference from their profits. The coffee business
obviously offers relatively large profits, as can be concluded from the increasing number of coffee
traders, despite the general stagnation on the market.
27 Customs representatives explain that this does not mean that the imports were not taxed. It is possi-
ble that the trucks entered through Kulata and were later cleared at some of the internal customs
bureaus.
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The main channels for shadow import are based on the shops for non-pack-
aged coffee and the off premise sector – restaurants, cafes and hotels. The sales
made there are not always registered, it is not clear how much coffee was actually
used for each serving, and in establishments of lower category a non-packaged surro-
gate is served instead of the advertised quality brand. 
The representatives of companies for trade with non-packaged coffee claim
that the coffee business is already one of the most legal and competitive in the
country. When customs duties (previously 25 percent of the value) were dropped,
coffee became less attractive for the shadow economy. According to one importer,
customs duties for one container are only 6,000 leva now. Furthermore, since 1997
the gray sector has been subject to persistent control.28
Another precondition for the legalization of business was the appearance of
large international companies on the market. The purchase of company and trade-
mark Nova Brasilia29 by Kraft Foods in 2001 can be considered as a turning point in
this process. It is interesting to note that customs statistics show a sharp increase in the
officially declared value of coffee imports in that year.30
In conclusion: the Bulgarian coffee market started a gradual legalization as a result
of reduced duties and taxes levied on coffee (dropping of customs duties), increased
control and appearance of international companies on the Bulgarian market.
Coalition 2000 estimates that gray sector now represents 15-20 percent. Main vio-
lations are conducted during the import, with roasted coffee being declared as raw,
or with part of the weight being concealed. Outright smuggling is also possible.31 Most
often, the non-packaged coffee is smuggled. The channels for consumption of gray
imports are most often linked with hotels, restaurants and cafes. Even though the
more expensive, packaged coffee should be more attractive to violators, the frauds
involving such coffee in practice represent a small part of the gray market and do not
significantly harm the budget. The Ministry of Finance pays more attention to fuel and
cigarettes, and lists coffee under "other" excise goods.
1.2.8. TURKISH AND CHINESE CHANNELS
Analyzing the gray and black market, the terms "Turkish" and "Chinese" channels
appear quite often. These terms are not so much linked to any specific goods, but
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28 The question of coffee has been somewhat politicized, because the former Minister of the Interior,
general Bogomil Bonev used to be a lawyer of the Lebanese owners of Nova Brasilia at the beginning
of his career. At that time, market share of this brand was around 90 percent. The question of the so-
called "political umbrella over the coffee smuggling" was raised in the Parliament after Bonev begun
to threaten particular economic interests, connected with sugar. Following the demand from the
General Prosecutor, the National Service for Combating Organized Crime has investigated the coffee
imports, made during the last four years.
29 Kraft Foods bought Nova Brasilia in May 2001. But the owners of Nova Brasilia began to seek an inter-
national buyer using the services of Pricewaterhouse Coopers already in 2000, when they complete-
ly orientated towards legal business.
30 At the same time when trademark Nova Brasilia became the property of Kraft Foods and it was clear
that this brand would be sold only legally, its market share started to decline even further. From 62
percent in June 2001, it fell to 45 percent in June 2002. It can be presumed that the company is less
competitive when operating legally.
31 Some experts believe that outright smuggling is continuing at the Kulata checkpoint. They believe that
in the first half of 2002, numerous containers were smuggled into the country, with bribes of 8,000 to
10,000 leva paid per container.
rather to their origin. Enormous quantities of cheap, low-quality goods, produced in
these two countries enter Bulgaria. Since customs duties are rarely paid, these goods
acquire additional market advantage. Apart from hurting the budget (it is estimated
that only between 10 and 15 percent of necessary customs duties are paid for these
goods), such import is destroying the domestic textile, leather and shoe production.
Few years ago, the illegal imports from Turkey were more popular, but in recent years
imports from China took over. Customs duties for various Chinese goods range from
7-8 percent to 25-40 percent. In case of a container with customs value of 100,000
leva, such duties exceed 40 percent. In contrast, due to the free trade agreement
between Bulgaria and Turkey, no customs duties, but only VAT is levied on industri-
al imports from Turkey.
One of the characteristic features of Chinese and Turkish imports is that in one
truck, goods for several recipient companies are transported. The import is conduct-
ed by special intermediaries, which arrange all customs formalities. Transport vehicles
are often overloaded. Sometimes more than 200 different articles, ranging from shoes
to hair-clasps are transported in them. This makes it difficult to levy customs duties
accurately. A thorough inspection of such truck can last up to 24 hours. This tempts
the customs officials to levy duties "per kilogram." 
Consequently, numerous frauds with quantities and customs values are possible.
Domestic textile and shoe producers claim that in some cases, the customs duties of
imported goods were lowered 20 to 30 times.32
The Customs Agency confirmed that the new customs authorities found out that
very low customs duties have been indeed levied on this type of imports. In the dis-
cussed period, one 40-foot container transporting a mixed cargo of Chinese goods
was estimated at 20,000 to 25,000 leva of customs value. In the summer of 2002, the
declared value of the same container was already 100,000 to 120,000 leva.33
According to the information of the Customs Agency, in the first half of 2002, 300 con-
tainers of mixed Chinese goods, in addition to 60 tons of air cargo, entered the coun-
try each month. Turkish goods are imported with trucks, carrying from 2.5 to 12 tons.
In the last months, the customs value of such trucks was increased from 10,000 to
30,000 leva. A large part of the Turkish imports through Kapitan Andreevo is declared
"transit goods" and channeled to the Free Zone Svilengrad, from where it is distributed
to the former Soviet republics. The distribution point for countries to the west of
Bulgaria is in Ili‡nci (Sofia). The customs claim that they managed to increase customs
values through stricter control.
The official claim is also that since spring 2002, the outright smuggling of such
goods was rooted out. The domestic producers partly agree with this claim, explain-
ing that in August and September 2001, the smugglers were confused not knowing
"who to bribe." After learning that the British company Crown Agents will "take over"
the customs, the smugglers reactivated their channels between October and early
32 They claim that such channels reached their peak in 1999-2000. In that period, around 90 percent of
shoes sold in Bulgaria were either smuggled or imported through customs frauds. The Union of
Leather, Shoe and Haberdashery Industry informed (relying on the data from the National Statistics
Institute) that in 2000, over 8 million pairs of shoes were sold in Bulgaria. When the officially import-
ed and domestically produced shoes are deducted, it turns out that 7.8 million pairs came from
"nowhere," that is from Turkey and China. 
33 In 2001, 138,539,000 kilograms of goods were estimated to be worth 216,509,000 leva. In the first six
months of 2002, 46,849,000 kilograms were evaluated at 144,379,000 leva.
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December. The illegal import was even increased for 200 percent in this period.
Another peak was in March – April 2002, when the number of containers with
Chinese goods was four times higher than for the previous months. After that, the
imports from China received the special attention of the customs administration, and
the raising of the customs value also had its impact. 
The experts estimate that in August and September 2002, when the shops were
stocked, a compromise was made. Part of the goods was imported at a higher price,
part was re-exported, and part was nevertheless smuggled, not without the help of
corrupt customs officials.34
The main routes of smuggling are:
The Asian port – a Mediterranean port (Malta, Sicily), where goods are transferred
on a smaller transport vessel – Thessaloniki – Kulata
Internal customs bureau (mostly Sofia) or Thessaloniki – Novo Selo – internal
bureau (Plovdiv, Kazanluk, Haskovo, Dimitrovgrad)
A significant part of imports from Far East travels through the ports of Varna and
Burgas
The overall volume is around 200 containers monthly, but in certain months it can
reach up to 400-450 containers. 
The bribes for state officials participating in smuggling or gray import vary
between 500 leva for a container in Kulata or Novo Selo, and 1,500 leva for a con-
tainer in internal customs bureaus, where the clearance is conducted. 
The most common types of frauds involve concealment of large quantities of
goods, and the reduction of value on which duties are levied.35 Such frauds are easi-
ly detectable due to the large difference between the declared and the actual weight
of the cargo, and this should be applied in the efforts to end such smuggling. Another
way to counter it is to significantly reinforce the post-clearance control according to
Article 84 of the Customs Law in close cooperation and coordination with tax author-
ities.
Apart from the illegal imports from the Far East discussed above, there is also a
channel for import of roughly two hundred 20-ton trucks of similar goods per
month from Dubai. The corruption level is similar to those regarding the Chinese
containers. The route is: customs free zone in Syria – Turkey – Kapitan Andreevo –
internal customs bureaus.
Non-foodstuff consumer goods from China and Dubai are smuggled also
through the Sofia airport. The quantities depend on the time of the year and range
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34 A customs official, conducting a fictive inspection of two containers of Chinese goods, was arrested.
In a separate incident, four containers of Chinese goods were cleared with only one customs receipt.
35 Import through the border crossing Novo Selo has a specific feature. Before the goods arrive there,
they are transferred from containers onto trucks in the port of Thessaloniki. The cargo from three con-
tainers is transferred on two trucks. In this way, opportunity to conceal part of the cargo, its origin and
its value is created. In such case, the bribe paid at the internal bureau during the clearance 
is higher – 2000 leva per truck.
from 40 to 150 tons a month. Bribes in the amount of 1.50 leva per kilogram are divid-
ed among different services, involved in the scheme. The main route is via Moscow
to Sofia, with cargo departments of passenger planes being used.
1.2.9. FRUITS AND VEGETABLES (TURKEY, MACEDONIA, GREECE) 
The high volume of smuggled fruits and vegetables represents a serious problem.
Between October and May, around 250 trucks (with a size of 60-70 cubic meters) a
month from Turkey, around 20 a month from Syria, and 8-12 smaller trucks a day
from Macedonia have entered the country.
As a rule, customs clearance of fruits and vegetables is conducted at Kapitan
Andreevo checkpoint immediately after they enter the country. Around 1,000 leva
bribe for each truck is paid during the clearance. The bribes are divided among
all services, involved in the clearance of these risk-carrying goods (customs, san-
itary control, the hygiene-epidemiology institute, economic police, regional
bureau for combating organized crime, traffic police, etc). The so-called "seal"
method is usually used - the goods with lower tariff rate are declared, while in fact
goods with higher tariff rate (like onion and tomatoes) are imported. The same chan-
nels are used also for poultry and meat.
The weak point of this scheme is the possibility for a thorough customs inspection
in the section between the last, third barrier of the Kapitan Andreevo border crossing
and the village Kapitan Andreevo (around 3 kilometers), where warehouses of com-
panies-importers are located. These warehouses are used as a cover and for issuing of
false transport documents, which make post-clearance control in the interior of the
country virtually impossible.
1.2.10. MEAT AND MEAT PRODUCTS
The principal routes for import of meat and poultry are USA – Thessaloniki –
Kulata – Sofia; Western Europe – Vidin – Sofia; Western Europe – Kalotina – Sofia;
USA – Western Europe – Black Sea ports; Thessaloniki – Novo Selo – Plovdiv. On
average, 250 refrigerator trucks enter the country each month. The bribes range from
800 to 1,000 leva at the border crossing (divided between customs and veterinary
authorities) to 2,500-3,000 leva on internal customs bureaus (with additional
500-1,000 leva paid to the veterinary authorities). Main weaknesses: the producer
is not indicated on the boxes; false certificates; it is possible to check the export dec-
larations from the EU and receive the information regarding the real tariff number.
As a result of improved control on the side of customs administration, the declared
quantities of meat and meat products significantly increased in 2002 as compared to
the same period in 2001 (according to official sources, the increase is 50 percent). As
a direct consequence, the collected VAT was 1.5 higher and the collected customs
duties three times higher than in 2001. It can be concluded that not only smuggling
was limited, but also the customs frauds involving false declaration of goods and
incorrect tariff number, both leading to reduced payment of necessary customs
duties.
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1.2.11. CHOCOLATE AND OTHER SWEETS 
These goods, produced in Turkey, are imported through Kapitan Andreevo, with
customs clearance conducted mainly in Plovdiv. Around eighty 10-ton trucks are
imported monthly. Corruption levels are similar to those at the import of non-
foodstuff goods from Turkey, described above. Large part of the goods does not
comply with the Bulgarian State Standard and are imported with false certificates. 
Among other food products of special interest is the import of milk powder from
Ukraine and Russia through Ruse and Kardam. Several thousand tons are imported
every month. False certificates of origin from Poland are used. The bribes are about
4,000 leva per truck, divided among several services. The pure profit from the sale of
one truckload of milk powder in Bulgaria is between 10,000 and 12,000 USD.
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2. DRUG SMUGGLING 
2.1. SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Like with other criminal forms of "business," a special problem connected with
drug smuggling is the lack of not only accurate, but even of approximate statistical
data. When analyzing the volume of smuggling of consumer goods, part of which is
conducted semi-legally (through various forms of document frauds), some approxi-
mate estimates can nevertheless be made. This cannot be done with drug smuggling. 
Consequently, the only available method to assess the volume, roots, prices and
trends in the development of drug smuggling through Bulgaria are some indirect
methods:
Comparative analysis of the annual quantities of drugs, confiscated by competent
authorities
Sociological research and expert estimates of drug consumption in the country
(which gives an idea about the extent of drug distribution in the country)
Expert estimates about the market values of drugs in the country, as well as in sep-
arate regions (which estimates the demand/supply relation)
An additional problem is created by the lack of sufficiently reliable data about the
drug consumption, which could offer a picture of the current and future situation in
regard to the spread of drugs in society. This was also noted in the report of the British
experts, entitled Bulgarian Twinning Operation: Review of Demand Reduction Strategy
from May 2000.36 The report also claims that the information systems in this field are
not well coordinated and subordinated to a strategic goal, that there is no coordina-
tion between the information on demand and on supply, that a good analysis of avail-
able data is missing, etc.37
Smuggling through Bulgaria is part of a transnational channel for illegal transfer of
narcotic substances. In the past years, this transfer was stimulated by a number of cir-
cumstances, favorable to smugglers. The systematic and virtually ceaseless traffic of
narcotics from Afghanistan through Iran, Turkey and Bulgaria to Western Europe was
facilitated by the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, the lifting of visa restrictions within
the EU and by the increase in the drug production under the Taliban regime. 
36 The report states that "it is not possible to give accurate or complete assessment of the present situa-
tion and of the future prospects regarding drug abuse based on the available information." 
Ibid.,p. 8.
37
Ibid., p. 8.
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At the same time, apart from the Balkan route, importance of several new routes
for the transfer of heroin from Southwest Asia to Europe has increased – through
Central Asia and Russia, with Central Asian countries Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan beginning to play a significant role in drug trafficking.
Experts believe that increasing quantities of heroin travel along this "Silk Road." The
Black Sea is also used more and more often for transferring heroin to Romania and
Bulgaria both from Turkey and Georgia. Recently it was discovered that the ferry line
between Istanbul and Trieste is also used for direct transfer of heroin to the EU. As a
consequence, the importance of the tra-
ditional Balkan Route from Turkey
through Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Croatia,
Slovenia and Austria to Central Europe
has diminished, as has been noted also in
the Annual Report of the Balkan
Information System for 2001. This route
was used in only 13 percent of all regis-
tered cases of heroin smuggling (in 2000,
it was used in 19 percent of the cases.)
An indication of the level of intensity
of drug smuggling through Bulgaria are
the statistical indexes for discovered and
confiscated quantities of heroin on bor-
der crossings and in the interior of the
country. Unlike the first quarter of 2002,
when no cases of traffic of drugs and pre-
cursors through Bulgaria were registered,
in the second quarter the following quan-
tities were discovered:
168.625 kilograms of heroin (8 cases)
9.390 kilograms of amphetamines (2 cases)
2.450 kilograms of hashish (1 case)
2.636 kilograms of marijuana (1 case)
Five Bulgarian, five Yugoslav, three Romanian, three Macedonian and one Turkish
citizen were arrested for drug smuggling. It is interesting to note that the smuggling
through the border crossing at Malko Turnovo has increased (in two cases, 114 kilo-
grams of heroin were discovered, and in one case 6.6 kilograms of amphetamines).
The Kapitan Andreevo checkpoint, where control has been improved, seems to be
used less frequently now (only one case with 20 kilograms of heroin). More often,
drugs are shipped in small quantities (from 5 to 10 kilograms) with railway transport.
As far as smuggling of drugs and precursors is concerned, Bulgaria is a typical tran-
sit country, although few temporary bases for short-term storage and re-packing of
drugs on our territory have appeared. The same route used for traffic of heroin from
Turkey through Bulgaria to Western Europe is used in the opposite direction for traf-
fic of synthetic narcotics, cocaine, marijuana, hashish and precursors. The intensive
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Chart 5: Confiscated narcotics in 2002 
(second quarter)
trans-border traffic of narcotics has lead
also to the increase in the local drug
abuse and to the growth of distribution
networks.
2.2. HEROIN SMUGGLING 
The geographic position made
Bulgaria one of the principal routes for
heroin traffic. After Turkey, Bulgaria is the
second barrier for heroin on its way from
Asia to Europe. Large-scale heroin traffic
is conducted by foreign drug smuggling
organizations, among which Turkish and
Albanian are the most important ones.
They have long lasting experience, well-
organized networks and enormous finan-
cial resources. Turkish drug syndicates
and their distributors in European cities
control the largest part of Balkan routes.
Statistics show that they are involved in
59 percent of the cases of drug trafficking
in the Balkans. The foreign drug-smug-
gling networks show a permanent aspira-
tion for mutual criminal cooperation with
similar Bulgarian organizations with the
goal of facilitating easier and faster trans-
fer of narcotics through the country.
Apart from being an important transit
country for heroin, in recent years
Bulgaria turned into an important "ware-
house" for redistribution of this narcotic
substance. Heroin consumption in the
country has also increased, owing to the
fact that Bulgarian criminal organizations
receive part of the smuggled heroin as a
payment for their participation in the traf-
fic. As a result, more heroin now remains
in the country to be sold on the Bulgarian
drug market. The number of drug dealers
has similarly increased. Large cities like
Sofia, Varna, Burgas and Plovdiv have the
highest number of drug abusers, including
those addicted to heroin.
During 2002, the traffic and distribu-
tion of heroin and precursors for its pro-
duction continued to be concentrated in
large cities and along the E-80 highway.
Relatively well-developed transport and
41Corruption, Trafficking and Institutional Reform
500km
Hamburg
Berlin
Frankfurt
Milan Venice
Ancona
Brindisi
Palermo
Athens
Marseille
Porto
Lisbon
Marrakesh
Tanger Tunis
Barcelona
Bremen
Rotterdam Warsaw
Ankara
Halab
Odessa
Felixstowe
Paris
Gdansk
M e d i t e r r a n e a n  
S e a
A t l a n t i c
O c e a n
N o r t h
S e a
Beirut
Damascus
Alexandria
to United States
to South
America
Algeria
to the
Caucasus
to Kuwait
Baltic states
to Moscow
Poti
Varna
6
5
Belgrade
7
1
2
Brussels
3
4
Genoa
Budapest
Bucharest
Constanta
Novorossiisk
Capitan
Andreevo
2. From Turkey, through Greece,
to Jugoslavia and Albania;
3.From Turkey, by sea to Romania 
and then to Central and Eastern Europe;
4. From Turkey and Pakistan 
by sea to Albania;
5. From the Former Soviet Countries 
in middle Asia, through Black sea 
and then to Bulgaria and Romania;
6. Through Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania
and Bulgaria to West Europe;
7. From Latin America, through the harbours of
Bulgaria to Spain and Netherlands 
1. From Turkey, through Bulgaria,
Macedonia, Romania,
Jugoslavia and Albania;
According to the department Narcotics of the Sofia Directorate for Internal Affairs,
heroin worth more than 150,000 leva (75,000 Euro) is sold in Sofia every day, of
which pure profit amounts to 80,000 leva (40,000 Euro). Profits are divided among
dealers and their bosses in the capital (around 300 persons). According to the offi-
cial data, around 57,000 people use heroin in the country.
Heroin entering Bulgaria is very pure – usually between 50 and 60 percent, and
costs nearly 20,000 leva per kilogram. The street value is around 150,000 leva per
kilogram. One half-gram dose costs around 20 leva.
The profits of those who smuggle the narcotic into the country are 100 percent,
since they get two kilos of heroin from one by reducing its purity. Before reaching
the street, heroin passes through several intermediaries, with more additives added
each time. In the end, the purity of the heroin is reduced to the point which
enables dealers to make between 300 and 400 leva of pure profit per day.
According to the Ministry of Interior, there are 10 large bosses in Sofia. Each deal-
er covers the territory, usually including ten parallel streets. The most profitable
areas are the center and one of the most densely populated neighborhoods
(Lyulin).
Distribution of heroin in Sofia 
Chart 6: Drug smuggling channels 
crossing Southeast Europe
telecommunication infrastructure cre-
ates conditions for fast transfer of ship-
ments through the country. According to
observers, Turkish citizens, smuggling
narcotic substances (mostly heroin) from
Turkey to Western Europe, meet with
Bulgarian smugglers on Shell petrol sta-
tions, located along the Trakia highway,
and sell them packages of at least 500
grams of very pure heroin. The drug is
paid for on the spot. Most of it is distrib-
uted in Plovdiv and some in the
Pazardzhik region. In Varna, one of the
main organized criminal groups,
involved in heroin distribution in the
region, also deals with car thefts and
racketeering of the owners of stolen cars.
The tendency of individual local
criminal groups to organize independent
drug smuggling channels has been also
noted. This created preconditions for
brutal clashes, leading to escalation of
tension, connected with division of terri-
tories.
It can be expected that intensified efforts to curb heroin smuggling will lead to the
establishment of alternative channels. The shipments will most likely travel in a direc-
tion which does not lead directly to their final destination.
2.3. COCAINE SMUGGLING 
The trans-continental traffic of cocaine through Brazil and Venezuela to Europe in
which Bulgaria is a transit country is continuously on the rise. Air transport is used
most often. Transport is usually divided into several legs, with different couriers
involved in each part of the journey to avoid unnecessary suspicion, which a person
traveling from one "risk" country to another might arouse. Smaller quantities, traf-
ficked to neighboring Balkan countries, are transported by cars. There are indications
that a channel for cocaine smuggling from Bulgaria to Ukraine (run by Ukrainian citi-
zens) is being activated. It seems that in the near future this channel might be used
also for smuggling ecstasy and acetic anhydride to Turkey. The Plovdiv region is
becoming a center for traffic of cocaine to and from Bulgaria.
South American cocaine is arriving to Bulgaria from various directions:
From Uruguay through Cyprus to Varna and Burgas ports;
From Paraguay through Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria to Western Europe;
From Columbia through Turkey and Bulgaria to Western Europe;
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Turkey – Bulgaria – Romania – Hungary – Austria – Germany – France,
Belgium, Holland, Great Britain;
Turkey through Bulgaria in the direction of Romania – Hungary – Slovakia –
the Czech Republic and Poland. The non-traditional route from Macedonia
through Bulgaria and Romania to Hungary is also used;
Turkey through Bulgaria in the direction of Romania, Moldova and Ukraine.
Heroin is transported by buses and trucks with Moldovan, Turkish and
Ukrainian registrations;
Turkey directly to Bulgaria;
From Bulgaria to USA;
In direction of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Austria;
From Turkey through Bulgaria to Greece;
From Turkey through Bulgaria to the Czech Republic;
From Turkey through Bulgaria to Western Europe with international trains –
channel for traffic of heroin with the help of train conductors and stewards, and
under patronage of the "power groups;"
From Turkey to Bulgaria with boats across the Black Sea in the Ahtopol region;
Heroin is imported also through Varna and Burgas ports, with Bulgarian,
Turkish, Russian-speaking and Arab citizens involved. There are no publicly
available data for heroin discovered in these two ports in the last three years.
The main channels for heroin follow these routes:
From Brazil and Venezuela through German and French airports to Bulgaria;
With accelerated post deliveries from Columbia and Brazil through Germany and
France to Bulgaria;
From Brazil through France to Bulgaria;
A channel for transport of cocaine involving bus passengers from Bulgaria through
Yugoslavia, Hungary, Slovakia to the Czech Republic;
With airplanes from Brazil through Amsterdam and Vienna to Bulgaria;
From island Aruba through Frankfurt to Bulgaria.
The number of cocaine dealers in Bulgaria has increased, as the results of police
investigations demonstrate. The cocaine consumption is also on the rise, but at a slow
pace due to the small purchasing capacity of the population. Only 2-3 percent of drug
abusers can afford to use cocaine. This narcotic is popular among the organized crim-
inal groups, engaged in the smuggling of cocaine and other narcotics.
2.4. SMUGGLING OF CANNABIS, MARIJUANA AND HASHISH
The main channels for smuggling of cannabis, marijuana and hashish are the fol-
lowing:
Smuggling of marijuana from Albania through Macedonia and Bulgaria for Turkey.
Albanian, Macedonian and Yugoslav citizens – ethnic Albanians – are involved.
The narcotic is transported with cars and minibuses with Albanian and
Macedonian registrations;
From Pakistan through Egypt with ships to Greece and from there to Bulgaria with
trucks;
From Albania through Macedonia and Bulgaria to Turkey with trucks and vans with
Albanian registrations. Traffickers are Albanian citizens;
The marijuana and hashish market in Bulgaria is supplied also by local production.
Numerous cannabis fields have been discovered in the country, and large quanti-
ties of dry cannabis leafs confiscated from Bulgarian citizens. According to police
data, cannabis is grown by predominantly elderly people, who are paid by people,
linked to organized crime. In large cities, cases of some Roma families or of indi-
vidual consumers growing cannabis in plant pots in their homes were registered;
It can be claimed that local distribution and consumption of cannabis, marijuana
and hashish has significantly increased. According to some research, most hashish
is sold in Sofia, Veliko Turnovo and Pleven, and most marijuana in Varna.
The number of cannabis fields, grown on communal land or land without official
owners is increasing. Such fields are deliberately located further away from populat-
ed areas. Cannabis cultivation and production is often under the control of Bulgarian
criminal groups. The largest cannabis cultivation areas are the regions of Blagoevgrad,
43Corruption, Trafficking and Institutional Reform
Sandanski and Petrich. Cannabis fields have been registered also in some areas of
northern Bulgaria.
2.5. SYNTHETIC DRUGS
The problems related to smuggling and consumption of synthetic drugs are also
very serious, as both are on the rise in Bulgaria and in other Balkan countries.
Conducted investigations have confirmed the information that illegal establishments
producing synthetic drugs continue to operate. Six illegal laboratories, equipped for
the production of synthetic drugs were discovered in 2001 in the city of Sofia, and in
the Sofia and Ruse regions. Distribution of metamphetamine increased in Sliven,
Yambol, Stara Zagora and Burgas regions. Law-enforcing agencies are warning that
international drug syndicates are shifting the production of synthetic drugs from
Scandinavia to the Balkans.
The interest of the local criminal groups in synthetic drugs has also increased.
Some of the unemployed Bulgarian chemists, technologists and pharmacists partici-
pate in the production. Some of them are involved in the criminal cooperation with
citizens of neighboring countries. Synthetic drugs produced in Bulgaria are smuggled
to Macedonia, Albania, Turkey, Romania, Poland, Ukraine, Middle East and Africa
(Nigeria). The channels for smuggling of synthetic drugs from Serbia, involving Serbian
and Bulgarian citizens, and the channels for smuggling of metamphetamine to Arab
countries, involving Bulgarian and Turkish citizens, were discovered in 2002.
Consumption of synthetic drugs in Bulgaria has sharply increased. Few networks
for distribution were discovered in Sofia in the last three years. Ecstasy (although usu-
ally amphetamines are sold under this name) is used mainly by young people – pupils
and students. It is distributed mainly in discotheques and other places, where fans of
techno music gather.
The profits from the production, distribution and international smuggling of syn-
thetic drugs are enormous. According to the expectations, the production and con-
sumption of synthetic drugs in the country will continue to rise in the following years.
2.6. MARKET VALUE OF NARCOTICS
Assessments of the price at which various narcotics are sold are not uniform.
Approximate prices, given by informers, who are close to drug users, are in some
cases few times higher than the prices given by the National Service for Combating
Organized Crime.
Turkish drug traffickers are selling heroin for 10,000 – 12,000 leva per kilogram.
According to informers from drug-using circles, one gram of 40-50 percent pure hero-
in is sufficient for 15 doses sold for 5 leva, or even for 20 doses containing between 5
and 10 milligrams of heroin and sold for 10 leva. It is believed that the price of hero-
in is much cheaper in the Roma neighborhoods, but the quality there is also much
lower.
Two different and mutually hostile markets for cannabis exist in Bulgaria. One is
controlled by organized crime. Cannabis is sold in the form of ready-made cigarettes
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to minors and occasional adult consumers. But the larger part of cannabis is distrib-
uted by small dealers, who have direct contact with producers and who are selling the
narcotic to their friends with little or no profit involved. This so-called "friendly trade"
is typical for a larger part of the cannabis market in developed countries.
The criminal groups are continuing their efforts to increase their market share. The
process started in the period April – June 2001, when they undertook a series of activ-
ities against petty dealers, who were forced to subdue to the mafia control. The
actions were organized and coordinated. Members of mafia gangs had the addresses
of the petty dealers and were informed about their movement. Dealers claim that
active policemen participated in the beatings. As a consequence, the marijuana mar-
ket (at least in Sofia) underwent significant changes. The quality of available marijua-
na begun to drop, and numerous dealers who in the past categorically refused to sell
hard drugs were forced to start selling heroin. This development is extremely alarm-
ing. The lower quality of marijuana and the increased availability of heroin, coupled
by very low awareness level among the minors (a result of non-competent or virtual-
ly non-existent prevention programs in schools) are blurring the lines between mari-
juana and heroin and are making heroin more attractive. Since the profits in this sec-
tor of the marijuana market are relatively low, it can be presumed that the main goal
of criminal groups was namely to merge the teenage marijuana market with the hero-
in market.
Larger part of cannabis users continue to buy marijuana by weight, which is of a
relatively good quality (without additives) and costs between 0.30 and 1.00 leva per
gram. Probably over 80 percent of consumers are supplied in such a way because
adult consumers, who buy most of the marijuana, intentionally avoid buying ready-
made cigarettes from criminals, due to their high price, questionable quality and like-
ly presence of additives (including heroin). The value of dried, non-refined leaf mass
is from 80 to 100 leva per kilogram. Between 1,200 and 1,600 cigarettes can be made
from such a quantity. 
The value of hashish varies widely, depending on its quality. Informers believe that
first-class hashish can be bought for less than 1,000 leva per kilogram. The hashish sold
in Bulgaria is of loose texture, so it is impossible to form it into a thin stick, which
could be inserted into a cigarette. This narcotic is not yet widely available.
The most popular amphetamine is "Dupnica amphetamine" (amphetamine com-
bined with aspirin; the information on the bottle is in French; there is no data about
producer), sold in Sofia for one lev per pill. In some cases, this price can be a bit high-
er, but if the whole bottle (20 pills) is bought, the price can drop to 0.50 leva for a pill.
Minors are often ready to pay a higher price, even for amphetamines of extremely
suspicious look and quality, but even in such case prices rarely exceed 3 leva.
Amphetamines are often sold instead of ecstasy, which uninformed buyers believe
to be purchasing. The real ecstasy (MDMA) is very hard to obtain, and its price is very
high (15 to 25 leva per pill). Often, there is even very little amphetamine in such
"ecstasy," which is compensated by addition of caffeine.
LSD is a semi-synthetic hallucinogen, which appeared on the Bulgarian market in
the early 1990s. Its price is around 30 leva for a blotter and it is sold in various shapes
(five-point star, Che Guevara, cyclist, pussycat). It appears that LSD comes exclusive-
ly from abroad.
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2.7. DISTRIBUTION AND CONSUMPTION
The amount of drugs, confiscated in Bulgaria can give an indication of the extent
of drug distribution in the country. In the first six months of 2000, the National Service
for Combating Organized Crime confiscated on its own or in cooperation with other
services the following quantities of narcotics and precursors: 20.792 kg of heroin,
0.447 kg of cocaine, 30.393 kg of hashish, 1.44 kg of opium, 24.3 kg of amphetamine
substance, 400,007 kaptagon pills, 120,216 amphetamine pills, 3,031 ecstasy pills,
1,200 ephedrine pills and 20 liters of formamide. Sixteen people were arrested for
smuggling and 77 for distribution of narcotics. One illegal laboratory for production of
narcotics was discovered and four traffic channels broken. 
Official data for drug consumption in the country is alarming. The National
Strategy for Combating Narcotics (2002-2007) indicates heroin as the most serious
threat to the public health. In the last 5-6 years, heroin was responsible for over 90
percent of cases in which medical treatment was sought in specialized departments
in Sofia. Two thirds of heroin users are injecting the drug, which carries additional risk
of infection with hepatitis C and HIV. The average age of those seeking medical treat-
ment because of heroin abuse fell in the period 1995-2001 from 24.7 to 22.5 years.
This drop seems to be stabilizing now.
Another objective criterion is the num-
ber of drug-addicted patients, treated in
psychiatric establishments in the country
between 1990 and 1999. The data was
published in the National Strategy and fol-
lows below.
The distribution networks on the terri-
tory of the country are constantly expand-
ing. Activities of organized criminal
groups involved in the narcotics business
are concentrated on large cities in the
country (Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, Burgas,
Blagoevgrad, Haskovo), in border areas
(Blagoevgrad, Haskovo, Vidin, Ruse) and
in the cities, located along the interna-
tional highways (Plovdiv, Pazardzhik,
Veliko Turnovo, Ruse, Blagoevgrad). 
The distribution of narcotics is increas-
ingly under the control of organized
groups, which emerged from the former
"power groups." One consequence of the
increased activity of criminal groups operating in various regions is their desire to
permanently divide and occupy particular regional drug markets. Violence is usually
used as a means for taking over certain territory. In an attempt to eliminate the com-
petition and obtain full control both in particular areas and in the entire country,
numerous major criminal offences were conducted. The conflicts linked to the build-
up of permanent networks for the distribution of heroin and cocaine escalated in
2001-2002. A series of explosions, armed skirmishes, assassinations and arsons
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occurred as a result of the fight for territories in Varna and Burgas regions. The esca-
lation of tensions has grown into a violent confrontation between the higher levels of
criminal hierarchy.
All of the people, participating in groups, which distribute narcotics on the
Bulgarian drug market, are Bulgarian citizens, working under the control of bosses of
various "power groups." Each group operates almost exclusively on the territory under
its control. All groups are hierarchically arranged. Leaders of organized criminal
groups periodically change dealers to prevent leaking of information or infiltration of
undercover police agents. In some groups, dealers of Roma origin are active – for
example in the new "center" for heroin distribution, the Plovdiv neighborhood
Stolipinovo, populated predominantly by Roma. Active drug dealers are found also
among the residents of Roma neighborhoods in Kyustendil and other cities. The main
centers for drug distribution along the Black Sea coast, and in north-west and south-
west Bulgaria are Varna and Burgas. Drug markets and distribution networks in both
these regions are well structured, monopolized by the organized criminal groups and
controlled by a leader of a former "power group." 
Narcotics are distributed also by individuals with criminal record, who are not con-
nected to organized groups and who act independently. Many of them are dealing
with drugs both for their own consumption as well as to make profit.
Along with their main activity – the drug business – organized criminal groups
conduct numerous other criminal acts: arms trade, prostitution, gambling, car theft
and smuggling of stolen cars, distribution of counterfeit money and forged docu-
ments, etc. They cooperate with similar criminal formations from Turkey, Germany,
Holland, Macedonia, Romania and Italy. Thus common interest brings together
Bulgarian, Turkish, Kurdish, African, Italian and other criminals.
Some regions have very specific features. For example, in the Blagoevgrad region
drug trafficking in the direction of Macedonia takes place through Petrich, with local
criminal groups cooperating with Macedonians and with Albanians from Macedonia
and Kosovo, or through Sandanski region, where Pontus Greeks are involved. An
average package contains 1-2 kg of heroin and 0.5 kg of cocaine. In the Vidin region,
narcotic substances and precursors (acetic anhydrite) are smuggled mostly across the
"green border."
2.8. TRENDS OF DEVELOPMENT
The international character of drug smuggling requires that the exchange of gen-
eral and concrete information with similar services abroad takes place. Conduct of
international operations for countering and neutralizing local and transnational drug
syndicates is also needed.
The following short-term and medium-term predictions can be made, based on
the analyzed situation on national and regional level:
The territory of Bulgaria will continue to be used for smuggling of narcotic sub-
stances and precursors
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The process of cooperation between transnational drug-smuggling organizations
with local structures of organized crime will most likely intensify in 2002 – 2003
The convergence of drug business with other types of criminal deeds and its intru-
sion into legal economy through money laundering will increase
Bulgarian criminal groups will continue to cultivate, process and smuggle cannabis
to neighboring countries and Western Europe
The illegal production and trafficking of synthetic drugs will continue
The appearance of new channels is likely, with new methods and transportation
means used; it is also likely that new materials will be used for the production of
narcotic substances
The relative share of criminal acts related to drugs in the overall structure of crime
will increase
The levels of supply and demand for narcotic substances will continue to rise, as
can be seen from increased quantities of confiscated drugs
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3. TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS
Bulgaria lies on the migration route for various foreign nationals. Its territory is used
as a regional transit center for trafficking in human beings. 
Bulgaria’s geographic position was skillfully exploited by groups of Bulgarian and
foreign citizens, who transformed the migration flow into an organized national and
international criminal activity. A growing number of Bulgarian citizens living in border
areas are making human trafficking their main occupation.
Bulgaria plays three different roles in human trafficking:
as a transit route
as a final destination  
as a country of origin
Most foreign nationals who entered Bulgaria through illegal channels do not wish
to remain on its territory. The majority of those who have acquired the status of
refugees subsequently attempt to leave the country illegally. There are numerous
cases of people with refugee status in Bulgaria trying to illegally reach Western
Europe.
Based on the analysis of methods used for transfer of people across the state bor-
der, the international channels for human trafficking can be classified as legal, illegal
and combined.
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3.1. CHANNELS FOR 
TRAFFICKING 
The following methods are used for
crossing the border illegally:
Illegal individual or group crossing
across the "green border"
Foreign nationals enter the country
legally with transit visas and then exit
illegally through channels leading across
Macedonia, Albania and Italy to coun-
tries in Western Europe 
Foreign nationals enter the country
legally, but then attempt to exit with fal-
sified documents
Legal crossing into a neighboring
country for which no visa is required and
from there illegal crossing into Greece
Hiding in secret compartments of
transport vehicles entering the country
Using package tours to reach the
desired destination
Hiding in passenger and cargo trains
and ships
The following division of human traf-
ficking channels can be made:
1. Foreign nationals enter Bulgaria
legally and exit illegally.
From Romania through Bulgaria or Macedonia to Greece and from there to
Western Europe 
Mostly Romanian, Ukrainian and Moldovan citizens use this channel. Romanian
citizens have the easiest access to Bulgaria since they are not required to obtain a
visa. From Bulgaria, they illegally cross into Greece (either directly or through
Macedonia), and from there to Italy and other West European countries. These
channels are used also for trafficking of women for sex industry.
From Turkey through Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania and Italy to Western
Europe
Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin represent the majority of people trafficked along
this route. They reach Bulgaria by sea, air or land. From Bulgaria, they cross legal-
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ly or illegally into Macedonia,
Albania and Italy and from
there to Western Europe,
Canada or the USA. In some
cases, they reach Western
Europe after being trafficked
to Greece. The main problem
in cutting the channel for traf-
ficking from Turkey is that the
majority of people using it
have regular documents (they
have transit visas for the third
country). 
From Turkey through
Romania and Bulgaria to
Western Europe
The channel is used most-
ly by Turkish citizens of
Kurdish origin. They travel to
Romania by sea or by air.
Then they enter Bulgaria with
transit visas and illegally cross
into Macedonia across the
"green border," or Serbia by
using false Bulgarian pass-
ports. From there, they are
trafficked to Western
European countries.
From former Soviet
Union through Romania
and Bulgaria to Greece or
Macedonia and from there
to Western Europe 
These channels are used
primarily by citizens of
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and
Moldova. They travel to
Bulgaria by air, sea or land.
From Bulgaria, they are illegally transferred to Greece or Macedonia and Albania
and from there to Italy and other Western European countries. These channels are
used also for trafficking of women for sex industry.
From former Soviet Union through Turkey and Bulgaria to Greece and from
there to Western Europe 
These channels are used by citizens of Georgia and Armenia. They enter Bulgaria
as tourists in organized package tours and subsequently attempt to cross into
Greece or Macedonia and Albania with false documents or across the "green bor-
der." From there, they are trafficked to Western Europe. These channels are used
also for trafficking of women for sex industry.
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Chart 11: Channels for human trafficking
2. Foreign nationals enter and exit Bulgaria illegally.
From the Middle East through Turkey and Bulgaria to Western Europe
These channels are predominantly used by citizens of Afghanistan, Syria, Libya,
Iran, Iraq, as well as by Palestinians. The air, sea and land transport is used for
reaching Turkey. Trafficking into Bulgaria is organized across the "green border" or
by hiding in transport vehicles, entering through border crossings. From Bulgaria,
these people are trafficked into Greece or Macedonia and Albania and from there
to Western Europe.
Trafficking of persons of Hindu origin
Citizens of India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are trafficked through Bulgaria to
Greece and Western Europe. They enter Bulgaria by air or by land and then ille-
gally cross into Greece or Macedonia and Albania and from there to Italy and other
Western European countries.
Trafficking of persons from Africa
Citizens of Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Rwanda
cross Bulgaria on their way to Greece and other EU countries. Most of them enter
Bulgaria by sea or by air. Many are trafficked from Bulgaria through Serbia and
Hungary to Western Europe, Canada or the USA. In some cases, they exit Bulgaria
with false West European passports.
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In the first five months of 2002, 313 persons of various nationalities were
detained at the Bulgarian border crossings: 130 were Bulgarian citizens, 45
Turkish citizens, 37 were citizens of Iraq, the identity of 20 persons was not estab-
lished, 13 were Palestinians, 11 were citizens of Iran, 10 of Afghanistan, 5 of
Greece, 5 of Tunisia, 4 of Ukraine and 33 had some other citizenship. In the same
period, 423 persons, wanted by the police, were caught at the border crossings, of
which 387 were Bulgarian citizens and 36 were foreigners. For comparison,
between January and May 2001, 216 Bulgarian citizens and 27 foreigners were
arrested.
In the same period of 2002, 793 persons were not allowed to exit Bulgaria. They
included 614 Bulgarian, 21 Macedonian, 17 Greek, 17 Turkish, 10 Romanian, 8
Afghan, 8 British, 7 German, 7 Moldovan and 7 Ukrainian citizens, as well as 77
persons with other nationalities. In the first five months of 2001, 600 persons were
prevented from leaving Bulgaria, of which 452 were Bulgarian citizens and 148
were foreigners.
The total number of persons, who were not allowed to enter Bulgaria was 2268,
of which 962 were Turkish, 134 Ukrainian, 123 Russian, 87 Tunisian, 77 Bosnian,
74 Macedonian, 71 German, 68 Yugoslav, 66 Romanian and 60 Greek citizens,
while 564 were of some other nationality.
The officially repatriated persons numbered 298, of which 118 were Iraqi, 43
Nigerian, 21 Afghan, 12 Iranian, 12 Turkish, 8 Indian, 8 Somalian and 30 other
nationals. In the same period 1987 persons were deported (1255 in the same peri-
od of 2001).
3.2. CLASSIFICATION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKERS
Human traffickers can be divided into several groups:
Persons living in border areas, who assist individual immigrants or small groups to
cross the border illegally. They accompany immigrants to the border and show
them the direction in which they should go. Some of the people living in border
areas are used also as guides by larger trafficking organizations. Truck drivers, who
hide and transport immigrants across the border crossings, are also a part of such
organized groups.
Traffickers, who independently recruit persons, wishing to leave the country,
accompany them across the "green border" and then return to the country either
legally or illegally. Some of such traffickers used to be part of organized trafficking
groups and learned how and where to cross the border illegally. Some of them
have served in the army at the border.
Persons who accompany small groups of immigrants within Bulgaria and lead
them to a meeting point. There they are boarded on transport vehicles and trans-
ported to a shelter, where they stay either for a short or a long period of time.
Organized groups of traffickers, who are in contact with foreign nationals across
the border, use the services of document falsifiers and cooperate with border con-
trol officials.
Criminal groups, using tourist package groups or bureaus for recruiting candidates
for employment abroad as a cover. Such groups are the main traffickers of female
sex slaves. In cooperation with foreign criminal organizations, they traffic Bulgarian
women and girls to brothels in Western Europe, and, lately, also to brothels in the
western Balkans.
Trafficking organizations, operating mostly from abroad and providing false docu-
ments, transport and apartments for a sojourn. For immigrants who are well-off,
the so-called "safe channels" are provided.
There is a clear difference between traffickers, who conduct illegal services for the
immigrants from Bulgaria and other countries (mostly from Asia and Africa), traveling
to Western Europe, and the criminal groups, specialized in trafficking and inhuman
exploitation of women. The priority of counter-trafficking efforts should therefore be
organized criminal groups and the corrupt state officials cooperating with them.
3.3. PRICES OF TRAFFICKING SERVICES
Traffickers are paid between 200 and 10,000 USD, depending on the final desti-
nation, the method used for crossing the border, and the means of transport used in
the process. The prices depend also on the route used, the size of the group, etc.
According to the data provided by unofficial sources and by people, caught while
attempting to cross the border illegally, the prices, depending on the route, are as fol-
lows:
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From Istanbul to Sofia 500-700 USD
From Sofia to Thessaloniki or Athens 700-1,200 USD
From Sofia through Romania or Yugoslavia to Budapest 1,000-1,200 USD
From Sofia through Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Slovakia to Austria 
2,000-2,300 USD
From Sofia to Germany 2,000-2,500 USD
From Sofia to Italy 2,000-2,500 USD
From Sofia to Denmark or Norway 5,000-6,000 USD
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4. ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORM IN THE CUSTOMS AGENCY AND IN
THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR 
4.1. REFORMS IN THE CUSTOMS AGENCY
The legal framework of the Customs Agency38 is harmonized with the legislation of
the European Union and is based on several specific organizational principles of cus-
toms administration:
The principle of structural separation and centralization of customs administration:
This principle is characterized by an exceptionally hierarchical system of the
Customs Agency, built on three levels (national, regional and local) and incorpo-
rated into one, autonomous administration within the Ministry of Finance.
The principle of acceleration of customs procedures at the border and shifting of
customs activities into the interior of the country: This principle is applied through
the introduction of a two-tier customs procedure (customs clearance at the border
and in the interior) based on the EU practice, with special attention given to con-
trol in the interior (at the internal customs bureaus).
The principle of effective division of functions and tasks between customs bureaus:
This principle is based on the possibility for dynamic reorganization of the work of
individual customs bureaus and the possibility for assigning to them particular
tasks, which depend on their location, intensity of traffic, type of the means of
transportation, type of transiting goods, economic profile of the region, etc.
However, as it is the case with other Bulgarian institutions, the modern legal
framework and its successful adjustment to the EU standards are often in contrast with
practice. The efforts to counter smuggling of consumer goods, drug smuggling and
trafficking in human beings are not sufficiently effective yet, the systemic and individ-
ual corruption is still spreading, there is no clear government vision for overcoming
the weaknesses within the system, which make corrupt practices possible, the man-
agement of the Agency acts inadequately towards or inexplicably tolerates corrupt
officials, customs officials are obviously much better off than other state officials. All
these factors have contributed to the exceptionally negative public image of the
Customs Agency and of the customs officials in the years of transition. The main
incentive for the reform, which started at the beginning of the decade, however, was
38 Customs administration is conducting its work according to the Customs Law, Regulations on
Implementation of Customs Law and according to its Rules of Organization, adopted by the
Government. Customs Law forms the institutional and foundational framework of the customs activ-
ities, while Regulations on Implementation elaborate on its provisions in the functional scheme, and
the Rules of Organization on provisions in the organizational scheme.
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the realization that the greater the corruption and smuggling, the smaller the revenues
for the state budget.
*       *       *
The customs reform was among the priorities of the National Movement Simeon
II (NDSV, Nacionalno dvizhenie Simeon Vtori) and corresponded to its policy based on
honesty and fight against corruption. Such orientation was completely justified, con-
sidering the problems this institution faced under the government of Ivan Kostov
(1997-2001).39 The attempt to introduce radical changes undertaken by the team
headed by Mr. Emil Dimitrov in the fall of 2001, however, proved unsuccessful. When
his six-month term expired in February 2002, it became clear that the customs rev-
enues had decreased due to the break in coordination between the individual com-
ponents of the customs administration both on the central and regional levels.
Among the most significant reasons for the negative result of the first stage of the
reform were the lack of overall vision, the reduction of the reform to personnel
changes and the belief that the head of the customs, together with few assistants, can
personally control the entire staff of the Agency. On the positive side, the actions of
Emil Dimitrov did result in the temporary closure of some smuggling channels as a
consequence of a series of sudden inspections and numerous dismissals from work,
especially at the border crossing Kulata.
After February 2002, a period of "normalization" followed. To evaluate the term
"normalization" accurately, it needs to be explained what the normal condition of the
Bulgarian customs is like and which of the present practices within this institution will
most likely continue in the future. 
The updated business strategy of the Agency for the period until 2006 is based on
the following priorities: 
Adapting customs administration to EU standards
Strengthening the cooperation between customs, economic operators, businesses
and the public
Improving the collection of customs and other duties
Counteracting customs and currency violations
The developments within the Agency can best be assessed by the changes in the
collection of customs duties and other revenues, since such collection is an absolute
priority of the government, faced by increasing financial difficulties and public pres-
sure. In this regard, there has been a modest improvement within the customs. The
revenue collection increased for over 42 million leva in September 2002 in compari-
son with September 2001. The net budget revenues for the first nine months of 2002
were 98,985,941 leva higher than the revenues in the same period of 2001.40
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39 For more details see Corruption and Trafficking: Monitoring and Prevention, Sofia: Center for the Study of
Democracy, 2000.
40 See Dnevnik, October 9, 2002.
Since February 2002, the Customs Agency has undertaken numerous steps to
improve the effectiveness of the fight against customs violations and frauds:
Particular excise and risk goods can enter the country only through several
specifically selected border customs bureaus. This measure has limited the pos-
sibilities for illegal import of such goods. By concentrating technical and human
resources in these bureaus, the control was intensified, the possibilities for corrupt
practices reduced, and labor division in customs administration made more effi-
cient. 
Customs bureaus in which excise and risk goods will be exclusively placed
under the customs regimes import and export have also been determined. This
step is aimed at limiting the possibilities for conducting customs frauds with excise
goods by declaring them as other type of goods or by declaring untrue value or ori-
gin. 
The excise and risk goods will be exported or re-exported only through specif-
ic customs bureaus. This step will limit the possibilities for the so-called "fictive
export" when goods only appear to be leaving the territory of the country. As a
result of "fictive export," the due payments are avoided or VAT is illegally reim-
bursed.
In direct relation to the issue of intensified fight against smuggling, the changes in
the Road Traffic Law have empowered the customs control organs to stop
transport vehicles on the roads and conduct inspections in accordance with
the Customs Law. This has created another barrier to illegal import of excise
goods.
Customs administration is trying to implement the post-clearance control of cus-
toms declarations envisaged by the Law. Such control would be conducted on
the spot by inspecting the documents and the declared data concerning the per-
formed import and export operations. Although such control was formally defined
in the Customs Law (Article 84), it has still not been provided for with enough
resources. 
A contribution to the improvement of the fight against customs and currency vio-
lations is expected also from an impending introduction of a subsystem for cus-
toms investigation and intelligence as part of the Bulgarian Integrated
Customs Information System (BICIS). BICIS is already operating and connects all
customs bureaus in the country, but relies only on data from customs declarations.
However, these declarations are not automatically processed to determine the
level of violation risk, no assessment of the risk profile is made, and no intelligence
information is extracted.
A new mechanism for strengthening customs control over the import of liquid
oil products was designed. Specific instructions setting up clear rules for detec-
tion of illegal actions during the import of oil products were prepared for this pur-
pose. 
Increased control over the import of goods, characterized by a high level of
risk for customs violations, is being implemented. Such goods include meat and
meat products, fuels, Turkish and Chinese goods, cigarettes, alcohol, coffee and
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other excise goods, For this purpose, the
information on the type of goods entering
the Customs Agency database is being
analyzed. As a result, high-risk areas were
identified, where customs control needs
to be increased to prevent the declara-
tion of untrue quantities and values of
goods, causing losses to the state budget. 
The international cooperation with
the customs administrations of countries-
exporters enables inspections in cases
when the declared customs value or the indicated tariff classification of the goods
is suspected to be false. As a result of such inspections, numerous cases of false
declaration of value or tariff number, causing losses to the state budget, were
discovered. Such cases were sanctioned according to the law. 
The international cooperation for establishing the authenticity of origin certifi-
cates for fuels is also continuing. As a result, cases were established, where the
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From the beginning of 2002 until the fall of the same year, customs authorities ini-
tiated 8,455 legal proceedings on indictments for customs violations and 194 for
currency violations. Of these, 530 involved serious violations of customs law
(smuggling according to Article 233, customs fraud according to Article 234, and
diversion of goods under customs control, according to Article 234a of the Customs
Law), which represent a high degree public threat and cause considerable harm to
the state budget. 
In the same period, 6,926 decrees based on the indictments were issued. The vio-
lators were sentenced to pay the overall sum of 13,307,775 leva of fines.
Actions against customs violations
As a result of inspection at the border crossing Kapitan Andreevo, conducted jointly by the officers of the Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Directorate of the Customs Agency and the officials of the Ministry of Interior, the illegal import of vegetables was pre-
vented. The inspections established that in cases, when the cargo includes several types of vegetables, the real quantity correlation
between the various types is concealed. An increased quantity of goods on which lower customs duties are levied is declared, while
the weight of the other goods is significantly reduced or completely concealed. 
Twenty-one unconcluded transit operations for vegetable deliveries from Turkey were revealed. Violations were conducted by sev-
eral Turkish transport companies. The goods entered the country at customs bureau Kapitan Andreevo and were directed towards
the customs bureau Suhodol. However, by using false customs seals, the goods were diverted from the customs control and most
likely sold within the county without the due customs duties and other taxes being paid. Following this disclosure, another such
attempt to divert goods was prevented and the goods were detained. The officers of the NSCOC are investigating the case.
Thirty-eight other cases of related frauds were revealed. Twenty-four of them concerned deliveries of raw coffee, 5 were deliveries
of chicken meat, and 9 were deliveries of Chinese goods. These goods entered the country at the customs bureau Kulata and were
directed to the customs bureau Suhodol, but were diverted from customs control and their transit concluded with false customs
seals. The Regional Prosecutors Office in Blagoevgrad is working on the case.
Fifty-four transit-related frauds were revealed also at the Sofia airport. The goods were directed from the airport towards various cus-
toms bureaus, but were diverted from customs control and their transit concluded with false customs seals. The Regional Prosecutors
Office in Sofia is investigating these cases.
The investigation, conducted by the officers of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Directorate of the Customs Agency, has
prevented the attempt for customs fraud by presentation of falsified documents for customs clearance of nine cisterns, containing
450 tons of A-95 gasoline.
As a result of the investigation, conducted originally by the customs bureau Ruse and later by officers of the Customs Intelligence
and Investigation Directorate of the Customs Agency in cooperation with the NSCOC and the General Tax Directorate, several large
violations involving import of fuel were revealed. Companies-importers did not pay the due VAT, excise tax, the tax State Road
Network and the tax Preservation of Natural Environment in the overall sum of 1,487,015 leva. The fuel was cleared by customs
authorities on the basis of false payment orders. 
In order to prevent similar frauds in the future, the customs authorities must be able to follow whether the due taxes have really
been paid. Negotiations on how to make this possible are being conducted with the General Tax Directorate. This will prevent clear-
ance of goods in cases when importers have not paid the due taxes.
Two attempts to smuggle 7 kg of gold were prevented. Gold was hidden in special secret compartments in cars, traveling from
Turkey to Yugoslavia and Romania respectively. In a separate case, an attempt to smuggle 25 kg of precious metals, hidden in cars
traveling from Turkey to Moldova, was prevented.
An attempt to smuggle 30,952 USD hidden in cars traveling from Romania to Turkey was prevented.
Customs inspection prevented two attempts to smuggle objects of historic value out of the country – antique coins and other objects
of considerable value.
Cases of prevention of smuggling of goods in 2002
payment of the necessary duties was avoided by the illegal use of origin prefer-
ences. These cases were also sanctioned according to the law. 
The positive results in the fight against corruption and smuggling, as well as the clo-
sure of the chapter Customs Union in negotiations with the EU in the summer of 2002
represent a success for the new management of the customs. However, the short
period in which the undertaken measures were implemented does not allow for pre-
cise assessment of the long-term impact. A significant increase in revenues, singled
out as the principal priority of the reform, has also not occurred yet.
4.1.1. COOPERATION WITH CROWN AGENTS
At the beginning of 2002, the government made an unprecedented step by enlist-
ing the British consultant company Crown Agents to help with the reform in the cus-
toms. From the very beginning, the procedure for hiring the company and the defini-
tion of its role in the customs reform became a subject of criticism by the opposition
and by the public. The main points of the criticism were the following:
An unconvincing argument that the procedure for hiring the company to supervise
the customs was not public because the contract was linked to the question of
national security.41
The right of the Ministry of Finance to conclude a contract with a private foreign
company without this being approved by the Parliament, as is required for inter-
national contracts, was disputed.42
Suspicion arose that corruption has motivated the presumed infringement of the
law and of the procedures for public procurement, as well as the determination of
the sum, which is going to be paid to Crown Agents according to the contract (over
£8 million).
The competency of the company was questioned, since according to critics, its
experience is based on the work with developing countries in Africa, and not in
the former socialist countries.
The management of the Ministry of Finance was accused of non-professional
behavior because the size of the payment to Crown Agents was not bound to the
increase of revenue collection by the Customs Agency. Bulgarian experts have
pointed out that the criteria and methods for the assessment of Crown Agents’ per-
formance were not set.
There is no independent monitoring of the company’s performance and results.
41 See Novinar, May 11, 2002.
42 Fifty MPs turned to the Constitutional Court with demand that the contract should be declared as anti-
constitutional, since its interpretation and the relations between the two parties of the contract were
settled according to the British and not according to the Bulgarian law. The Constitutional Court ruled
that the contract is a private transaction of the state and is not liable to ratification in the Parliament
as opposition demanded. (See Pari, May 29, 2002.)
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Media criticized the representatives of the British company for not taking the nec-
essary measures to inform the public about their work within the limit of under-
standable considerations for discretion. The fact that the contract with the com-
pany was declared secret was mentioned as a proof that the accusations about the
lack of transparency were justified.
Although some of these arguments – especially the accusation of insufficient pub-
licity – have serious justification, it cannot be denied that some of the loudest accu-
sations were not aimed at protection of national interest and of priorities of the
reform, but served the interests of certain political parties and certain individuals. 
According to the head of the company’s team for Bulgaria, Mr. John Brown, the
priorities of the Crown Agents include: cooperation with the customs management in
internal audit, intelligence gathering and investigation, facilitation of trade, consulta-
tions in the field of legislations and ethics in the fight against corruption.43
It is not by accident that one of prior-
ities in the work of the British team
became the development of customs
control, which would use intelligence
and internal investigation for prevention
of smuggling and corruption in a more
efficient way. This goal can be achieved
only through the introduction of modern
methods for developing risk profiles on
the national, regional and local level,
and which would cover all border cross-
ings and all customs bureaus, both at the
border and in the interior.
The company is also advocating bet-
ter cooperation with the other law-
enforcing agencies, operating at the bor-
ders and in the interior, the development of an efficient cooperation with businesses
and with the civil society, etc. The Crown Agents gave an example in this respect by
declaring that it would act on signals, given by traders. According to the created
mechanism, data on illegal import will be sent to the Bulgarian Trade Chamber via the
Internet or telephone, and then forwarded to Crown Agents. Signals will not be
anonymous and will contain information about the date on which the violation
occurred, transport vehicles involved, border crossing where it occurred and the type
of violation committed.
Special interest and high expectations were raised by the joint action of Crown
Agents’ mobile customs teams, customs administration and the Ministry of Interior
regarding inspections of transport vehicles in the interior of the country, starting in
August 2002. The first results of such actions should become clear by the end of the
year. Immediately after the beginning of this operation, some media reported that the
work of the customs officials on measurement of the weight of the trucks has
improved. Thus, some of the crudest manipulations with quantities of registered
imports can be averted.
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Since the end of August 2002, five mobile teams for countering smuggling are oper-
ating on the Bulgarian roads. Each unit consists of two customs officials, one
NSCOC officer and a Crown Agents consultant. They are equipped with laptops,
cameras and other equipment. They also have a special weighing machine, which
corresponds to the EU norms. The data from the weighing machine is compared to
the data on customs documents, detecting any possible corrupt involvement of cus-
toms officials at the border.
The mobile teams can stop transport vehicles, check documents and transported
goods, and in case of suspicion detain the suspects. The inspections are carried out
after the risk assessment or upon a signal. The teams are in constant contact with
the regional departments of the Ministry of Interior and the results of inspections
are stored in the information system of the customs.
The road inspections
Although it is still too early to give an overall assessment of the work of Crown
Agents, it can be noted that the decision to recruit a consultant company from abroad
testifies to the genuine intentions of the government of Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha
to limit smuggling and corruption.
4.1.2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACCELERATION OF THE CUSTOMS REFORM
In order to accelerate the reforms and to increase their positive effect it is neces-
sary to implement several steps, some of which were also included in the govern-
ment’s anti-corruption strategy. We recommend that priority is given to the following:
Improvement of the cooperation between all law-enforcing agencies in fight
against smuggling, trafficking and related corruption. Political and public sup-
port has to be provided for the new forms of cooperation between the customs,
the Ministry of Interior and the National Investigation Service. Such cooperation is
necessary for overcoming the inherited bureaucratic and ineffective mechanisms
for interaction between these institutions.
Overcoming the lack of information exchange between customs and tax authori-
ties through a permanent mechanism for comparing the data from customs
declarations to the data from tax documents and to the information on paid
taxes.
Creation of a system for exchange of operative information between the
Bulgarian border customs bureaus and the customs bureaus in the neighboring
countries.
Optimization of the work of the customs through:
– Establishment of effectively operating structures for customs investigation
of smuggling violations, which would improve efforts for countering trans-bor-
der crime and related corruption.
– Introduction of a system for development of risk profiles, which would lead
to better coordination of internal control, intelligence gathering and investiga-
tion.
– Establishment of technological models for customs clearance of goods,
which would not depend on subjective factors. This will make possible the
introduction of control on several levels, based on information technologies,
which would enable objective registration of events and automatic notification
of specialized anti-corruption departments.
– Introduction of timeframes for conducting inspections of natural persons,
goods and vehicles at the borders and in the interior and during customs clear-
ance of goods. The use of such timeframes will lead to acceleration of process-
es, linked to customs clearance of goods and to a considerable facilitation of
import, export and transit of goods. Non-adherence to these timeframes should
be sanctioned with disciplinary and other measures.
– Optimization of number and composition of officers in dependence to the
timeframes and to the real volume of the work in customs bureaus in particu-
lar periods of time, so that a better balance between correct implementation of
legal provisions and facilitation of economic operations could be achieved.
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– The timeframes proscribed for processing complaints and requests of citi-
zens/clients should be shortened. The timeframes in which the respective
policy decisions are made should be shortened also through changes in the
legal framework, while preserving the strict observation of its provisions. Now,
decisions regarding complaints and requests are deliberately delayed, laws are
interpreted arbitrarily, etc. Such actions increase the corruption pressure on the
clients of the customs.
– Introduction of modern personnel policy, which would stimulate professional
growth of officials through various forms of training, examinations and assess-
ment of their acquired knowledge and skills. This will create preconditions for
successful professional growth and will guarantee transparency in appointment
to executive positions.
– Overcoming the present discrepancy between the large public and economic
importance of the work of customs officials and the level of payments in this
sector.
– Timely and appropriate sanctioning of customs officials, committing offenses.
More efficient use of mechanisms of publicity will put pressure on activities of
the entire customs administration.
– Informing the public on rights and obligations of customs officials. Citizens
need to know not only the jurisdictions, but also the duties of customs officials.
They also need to know whom they can turn to if officials fail to perform their
duty. This would limit the possibilities for dishonest officials to abuse their pro-
fessional status and to violate rights and interests of their clients.
These recomemdations are in line with conclusions, contained in the 2002 Regular
Report on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards Accession to the EU. The Report recommends to
Bulgaria to "focus on further alignment with the Community customs acquis, strength-
ening information technology and human resource policy, as well as on completing
major projects on revenue collection, transit control and risk analysis."44
4.2. ACTIVITIES OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FOR COUNTERING 
SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING AND CORRUPTION
4.2.1. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
According to the Ministry of Interior Act, fight against corruption is one of the main
priorities of this Ministry (Article 7, Section 3 from the Ministry of Interior Act). This
task is performed by several specialized departments.
The main task of the National Security Service (NSS)45 is the fight against corrup-
tion, linked to the involvement of foreign services and organizations. In other words,
the NSS investigates those cases of corruption, which directly threaten security and
legal exercise of the functions of state institutions. At the same time, the NSS investi-
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44 Commission of the European Communities. 2002 Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards
Accession to the EU.
45 Precise description of its functions is: the NSS conducts independently or in cooperation with other
state organs counter-intelligence activities for surveillance, detection, prevention and frustration of
planned, prepared or realized violations against the national security, linked to corruption.
gates and counters smuggling practices in which are involved state servants from the
system of the Ministry of Interior.
According to this service, the main risk represent the state institutions with juris-
diction over privatization of state property, those in charge with public procurement,
the customs, the departments with jurisdiction to sanction, and organizations work-
ing with important economic, political and organizational-governing data. The sharp
rise in illegal immigration has significantly increased the corruption pressure on agen-
cies, involved in border protection and on those charged with granting of refugee sta-
tus and Bulgarian citizenship. 
On the other hand, the experience from the transition period has showed that due
to its high importance, the NSS itself was subject to political pressure, expressed by
the attempts of those in power to use it against the opposition. However, the accusa-
tions that the NSS become a party agency and serves to compromise political oppo-
nents are very difficult to prove because of the thick curtain of secrecy, which covers
the work of this institution.46
The National Service for Combating Organized Crime (NSCOC) plays an excep-
tionally important role in the efforts to curb smuggling and the related corruption. The
NSCOC is a specialized operational and investigative police service with the  goal of
countering organized crime and corruption (Article 90, Paragraph 1, Section 10 of the
Ministry of Interior Act). For this purpose, the agencies of the NSCOC:
Establish, control and document activities of official persons who offer their serv-
ices to criminal groups and organizations
Investigate and trace the accumulation and transformation of possessions,
acquired by public officials as a result of corruption violations and corrupt prac-
tices
The NSCOC performs similar tasks in countering corruption within the Ministry of
Interior.
The NSCOC’s focus on the fight against organized crime presupposes its excep-
tionally active contribution to the interception of smuggling of goods and narcotics,
and of human trafficking, which represent the main "economic" activities of criminal
groups in the country. This explains why the most important disclosures of such
crimes are the result of the work of the NSCOC.
The National Border Police Service47 is a specialized protective, operational and
investigative police agency, which is especially active in countering human trafficking
across the state border and in the interior of the country.
46 Such accusations were directed also against the former head of the NSS, General Atanas Atanasov,
who resigned in November 2001, directly before the government of NDSV and DPS took office.
47 The National Border Police Service is specialized protective, operational and investigative police
agency, performing tasks on countering corruption. Its jurisdiction covers corruption violations linked
with smuggling of goods, smuggling of stolen vehicles, human trafficking and other crimes conducted
in border areas and on international airports and ports (Article 95, Paragraph 1, Section 4 of the
Ministry of Interior Act).
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The National Police Service (NPS) is a protective, operational and investigative
police agency. The investigation of signals for corruption is performed by the depart-
ment of Economic Police within the Directorate of the National Police Service and by
regional departments of Economic Police in the Regional Directorates of Internal
Affairs.
4.2.2. ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORM IN THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR 
The government program defines the following priorities for the Ministry of Interior
in the fight against corruption:
Limitation of corruption through creation of efficient mechanisms for countering
various manifestations of corruption
Development of anti-corruption legislation with respect to its harmonization with
international legal instruments and the EU law
Strengthening of the cooperation with other law-enforcing agencies, the judiciary,
media and civil society for countering corruption
Level of the public support for the work of the Ministry of Interior rose during
2002. The positive public image of the Chief Secretary of the Ministry, General Boyko
Borisov, and some other leading figures had a decisive impact on this development.
A more favorable social environment helped to define the following priorities in the
reform within the Ministry of Interior:
Stress upon professionalism within the Ministry of Interior 
This is a very important task due to the systemic destruction of public trust into
institutions, including the police. The professional honor of the Ministry of Interior
employees can be reestablished and preserved only if the Ministry is cleaned from
its corrupt officials, who damage the reputation of this institution.
Importance of concrete measures for overcoming the "war among institutions"
Among the most important activities of the Ministry of Interior in 2002 were the
initiatives of its management for overcoming the differences in the approach
between various law-enforcing institutions – courts, the Ministry of Justice, prose-
cution and the Ministry of Interior. These initiatives reflect the public demand that
the law-enforcing institutions stop opposing each other, since this contributes to
the spread of crime and corruption.
Further de-politicization of the Ministry of Interior
The modern definition of cooperation between the political government and the
professional community in the framework of the public sector contributes to de-
politicization of the most sensitive in this respect institution – the Ministry of
Interior.
The specific anti-corruption actions, listed as tasks of the Ministry of Interior in
2002 are linked with:
Improvement of the coordination between various services and departments
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Creation of a mechanism for information exchange
The public and the other state institutions have to be better informed on anti-cor-
ruption actions of the Ministry
Initiation of changes in the Criminal Code in order to criminalize the trade, sup-
ported by public officials, cooperating with criminal groups and organizations
The Ministry of Interior plans to realize a number of projects before 2005 for
increasing public intolerance towards corruption. The projects will be implemented
in cooperation with media and non-governmental organizations. More precisely, in
the Academy of the Ministry of Interior, special courses on Anti-corruption will be
held, in which topics related to the legal, institutional and practical counteraction of
corruption on national and international levels will be discussed. Projects, aimed at
increasing the level of professionalism and ethics of the Ministry of Interior employ-
ees will also be conducted.
The new management of the Ministry undertook the following measures for
countering corruption in the Ministry of Interior:
Status of departments, working on countering corruption, has been raised
A mechanism for an internal control over corruption was established
Measures for increased transparency in the work of the Ministry administration
were adopted
The rights, duties and procedures in regard to exercise of discretion jurisdiction
(taking expedient decisions) were clearly regulated; mechanisms for prevention of
conflict of interests were introduced 
Criteria for and control over the process of recruitment of candidates, their train-
ing and transition to full-time employment were improved
Anti-corruption training for employees on various levels within the Ministry and its
departments was introduced
In regard to the better coordination of anti-corruption activities within the Ministry
of Interior, an Internal Council headed by the Deputy Minister and responsible for
the cooperation between services in fight against organized crime and corruption
was created.
In the Inspectorate Service, a department named Counteraction against
Corruption in the Ministry of Interior was established. It exercises direct control
over the execution of instructions, given by the management of the Ministry of
Interior. Its tasks include generalization of information, collected by all services on
cases of corruption among the employees of the Ministry, and submission of this
information to the management of the Ministry.
Special regulations for collection of information and especially for access to
information were created. Access is now highly restricted and can be granted only by
the Minister or the Chief Secretary. The information activities of the Ministry of
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Interior for countering corruption will be integrated into the planned National
Integrated Information System, which will gather data from the entire state adminis-
tration, including the customs, tax authorities and official statistics. The management
of the Ministry of Interior believes that this will substantially improve the collection of
information on corrupt practices of employees.
According to the information of the Inspectorate Service, the number of signals for
corruption involving the Ministry employees has somewhat increased in 2002.
Most of the cases, investigated by the Inspectorate Service, were linked to the
abuses of professional position for personal gains and were manifested as:
Assisting the illegal actions of the criminal groups
Participation in the channels for human trafficking  
Participation in the channels for smuggling of goods and stolen vehicles 
Extortion of citizens
Unlawful contacts with persons with criminal records
In the first six months of 2002, the NSCOC investigated 183 signals for corruption
in state and local administration and within the Ministry of Interior. As a result of these
investigations, 13 legal proceedings and 6 preliminary investigations were formed, 11
cases for corruption were forwarded to prosecutor’s office to decide on competency,
11 signals resulted in administrative measures being taken, and in 27 cases signals for
corruption were found to be unjustified. The remaining 115 signals are still being
investigated.
Of 209 investigated persons, 100 were employees of the Ministry of Interior, 31 of
the customs, 11 of tax administration, 11 of regional administration, 11 were
employed within the judiciary, 11 were medical workers and 19 were employees of
state companies.
This situation is not much different from the one in 2001. In 2001, 181 Ministry of
Interior employees were investigated for corrupt practices. In 27 of the cases, investi-
gation was terminated, 69 signals are still being investigated, while 85 cases were con-
cluded. 25 employees were discharged, 50 were given disciplinary sanctions, 10 were
fired for inappropriateness, and the files of documents for 34 employees were for-
warded to the Military Prosecution.
The following corruption situation has been observed within the National
Border Police Service:
1. Criminal groups and individuals, conducting illegal acts linked with the violation
of state border continue to attract the Ministry of Interior employees to cooperate in
smuggling of goods and in human trafficking.
2. The corruption situation in Sofia, Svilengrad, Petrich, Vidin, Varna and Ruse is
alarming.
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3. Keeping in mind that the migration flow through Bulgaria is redirecting towards
its north-west border, an increase of signals for corrupt behavior among the employ-
ees in the Vidin region can be expected.
4. Due to changes in the normative acts, the organization and control over the
work on corruption disclosure in the Ministry of Interior was improved. Coordination
and cooperation between various departments, working on countering corruption,
has also significantly improved. As a result, higher efficiency in corruption disclosures
could be expected in the coming period.
In connection with the closure of the smuggling channel for stolen cars through the
border crossing at Zlatarevo, the management there announced that it would install a
new software system to prevent corruption. This software will make it impossible for
corrupt policemen to register false data for transiting passengers, vehicles and goods.48
Part of the plan for "cleaning the border police of corruption" includes also every-
day contact with police officers on the other side of the border. The access of unau-
thorized persons to the border crossing facilities will also be limited. For this purpose,
special permits will be issued
As with other official statistics, numbers alone cannot present the accurate assess-
ment of the real scope of corruption. Many victims of corruption extortion and those
whose interests were harmed as a result of corrupt deals fear the reaction of involved
officials and have not reported on such violations.
Both the government and civil society have to pay special attention to several
vicious practices within the Ministry of Interior, inherited from the past. These include
abuse of information on various levels within the Ministry, work without a plan or a
clear goal, the use of "disclosures from reserves" to demonstrate that something is
being done, unlawful connections with criminal groups, etc.
48 To improve fight against car thefts, the Ministry of Interior proposed changes to the Criminal Code.
This step is necessary, since the car theft can still be interpreted as "unlawful deprivation of transport
vehicle" for which sanctions are much milder. See Duma, September 9, 2002.
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CONCLUSION
In the last few years, the Bulgarian public got increasingly interested in the prob-
lems of corruption and crime, and in particular in the smuggling of goods, drug smug-
gling and human trafficking. All of these activities are performed in cooperation with
corrupt state officials.
Now it is widely understood that the criminal alliance between corrupt officials
and organized crime, which controls smuggling and trafficking channels, causes enor-
mous losses to the national economy and threatens security and health of the citizens.
"Black" and "gray" economies deprive the state budget of badly needed revenues and
create serious obstacles to the consolidation of market economy and democratic
institutions in the country. 
A big question remains to what extent corruption and smuggling have been con-
sidered a priority of state policy and political leaders. It seems that so far, their
destructive impact on market economy, national security, democratic institutions and
legal order in the country has been widely underestimated. Such underestimation of
these relatively new challenges is manifested also in the lack of appropriate institu-
tional infrastructure and working mechanisms for counteracting the trans-border
crime and related corruption.
A specific feature of this problem is the fact that through their lobbies in the gov-
ernment, smugglers and those officials, who are on their pay-lists, hinder reform
attempts of the institutions to limit corruption within their own structures. When there
is no clear political will to fight smuggling and corruption, the correlation of power
shifts to organized crime, and the dirty money used for financing of political parties
leads to a symbiosis between the government and the criminal underworld.
In the period, discussed in this report, the government stressed the necessity of
introducing ethics standard and of reducing smuggling in the country. Such policy
enables the unfolding of anti-corruption reforms in particular in the two institutions,
which play the largest role both in countering smuggling, and in the corrupt partner-
ship between state officials and smugglers – the Customs Agency and the Ministry of
Interior. These two institutions are in the spotlight of the present report, but this does
not mean that other state institutions and services with law-enforcing functions should
be neglected in the context of discussed problems. 
It is necessary to accelerate the reforms, aimed at more effective control, to
increase professionalism and to guarantee transparency and civic monitoring. Such
steps will contribute to the fulfillment of the most important goal, as declared by the
government – the increase in collection of customs and other state revenues.
The report did not discuss international and bilateral cooperation on the issue of
customs reform. It nevertheless concludes that introduction of EU standards in the
work of the customs is of crucial importance not only for limiting trans-border crime
and corruption, but also for the successful integration of the country into the
European Union.
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